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ABSTRACT 
The Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE) has rapidly grown in popularity over the 
course of seven years. After officially forming in 2013, the party won 8% of the seats in the 
Estonian Parliament in the 2015 elections. Then, in 2019, the party more than doubled this 
number when it won 19% of the seats in the parliament. The party has accomplished this 
impressive feat while advocating for the Estonian government to place a greater emphasis on 
sovreignity and traditional values. In addition to this emphasis on nativism, the party also 
promotes Eurosceptic language in both its policy goals and rhetoric. This thesis sets out to prove 
that, in the case of EKRE, this concern over cultural issues is related to the Eurosceptic nature of 
the party. By conducting interviews with party leaders, three categories of codes were created. 
Those categories are, Euroscepticism, nativism, and populism. From these codes, this thesis 
comes to the conclusion that EKRE is a hard-Eurosceptic party and its hard-Eurosceptic beliefs 
are fueled by nativism. 
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Introduction 
The goal of this thesis is to examine the Estonian political party known as EKRE 
(Conservative People’s Party of Estonia). This party is one of the many populist radical 
right parties in both Europe and the Baltic Sea region that is represented in its respected 
parliament. Additionally, it is a party that utilizes many Eurosceptic phrases and terms in 
its rhetoric and policy proposals. From this information, two questions emerge: how 
intense is EKRE’s Euroscepticism, and what fuels these Eurosceptic beliefs. The purpose 
of this thesis is to answer these two questions. 
It is important to study Euroscepticism because it is a phenomenon that has seen a 
major increase in coverage over the past decade. The 2014 European Parliament elections 
were hailed by many media outlets as being a major victory for the various far right and 
Eurosceptic parties.1However, the question remains, Where does this Eurosceptic outlook 
originate from? This thesis attempts to answer this question in the context of the Republic 
of Estonia. 
By using at a single case study, this thesis will illustrate what motivates the 
Eurosceptic policies and rhetoric utilized by the largest populist radical right party in the 
country of Estonia. This is an important task because, as will be shown in the thesis, there 
is not a universal consensus as to how this party came to prominence. As will be shown, 
there are numerous authors who disagree with the central findings of the research project. 
Therefore, this paper will help contribute to the debate on how and why a Eurosceptic party 
has emerged in this country. Another reason that this project is important is that it will add 
to an existing political theory. The Sussex-school of party-based Euroscepticism originally 
only examined party-literature. By using interviews as the primary source of data, this 
paper will help add on to the Sussex-school and its data collection.   
                                                          
1 Cas Mudde, On Extremism and Democracy in Europe (Routledge, New York, 2016) Location 886. 
NB! This book, along with “Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism vol.I,” and 
“Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism vol.II” are electronic books. They do 
not have page numbers, but location numbers. Therefore, the location of the quotations used from these 
sources will be denotated with a “Location number” rather than a page number. 
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 EKRE is a relatively new party in Estonia that was formed in 2013. By 2015 it had 
won around 8% of the seats in parliament and by 2019, it had gained around 19% of the 
seats in parliament.2 EKRE is a party that advocates for policies that promote traditional 
and family values as well as policies that attempt to address what the party sees as a 
demographic crisis in the country.3 It is evident that members of the party fear that the 
number of ethnic Estonians being born inside the country is too low and that immigrants 
from other countries are threatening the cultural identity of the state. This results in an anti-
immigrant stance that targets the EU refugee policies. As previously stated, this thesis will 
attempt to illustrate that these nativist views are what propel EKRE to take on a hard-
Eurosceptic party.  
 In order to see if it is true that EKRE is a hard-Eurosceptic party, the term has to be 
conceptualized and clearly defined. Over time there have been four popular ways in which 
Euroscepticism is defined each with their own distinct categories of parties and methods of 
categorization. However, for this research project, the conceptualization of Euroscepticism 
provided by Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak is the most appropriate. In their work, the 
two authors create two categories of Eurosceptic parties: hard and soft-Eurosceptic. The 
research conducted by this thesis indicates that EKRE should be considered a hard-
Eurosceptic party. This indicates that the party contains,  
“a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and…who 
think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose 
policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole 
project of European integration as it is currently conceived.”4 
This is in opposition to soft-Euroscepticism. For this term, the Sussex school states 
that, soft-Euroscepticism occurs when, “there is a not a principled objection to European 
                                                          
2 ‘Conservative People’s Party of Estonia Faction,’ Riigikogu, < https://www.riigikogu.ee/en/parliament-of-
estonia/factions/conservative-peoples-party-estonia-faction/> [accessed May 16, 2019] 
3 ibid 
4 Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism 
vol.I (New York, Oxford University Press, 2008) Location 181. 
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integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas 
lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU.”5 The difference between the two 
terms is that hard-Eurosceptic parties are those that wish to exit from the EU or, they 
believe that the EU, as it is currently constructed, is detrimental to the various member 
states. On the other hand, soft Eurosceptic parties are ones that do not necessarily believe 
that their country must refuse European integration or cooperation. In fact, many believe 
that the EU is beneficial. However, these parties believe that the EU has become too 
politically integrated or should refrain from accepting anymore new members.  
While EKRE does not advocate for exiting the European Union, it is a party that 
does oppose, “the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived.” This 
is in opposition to a soft-Euroscepticism. As will be later shown, the leaders of EKRE 
believe that the EU, as it is currently constructed, is fundamentally flawed. They believe 
that the EU is destroying the sovreignity of the nation state. They, and the party, see that 
the EU as attempting to usurp power from state capitals by imposing migration policies 
and “cultural marxism.”   
Although Taggart and Szczerbiak’s conceptualization was deemed to be the best fit 
for this thesis, there were still other categorizations of the topic that deserved examination. 
This includes the work done by Kopecky and Mudde, who developed their categorization 
to improve upon Taggart and Szczerbiak’s; the conceptualization created by Sofia 
Vasilopoulou, who wanted to fix the issues brought about by the two previous theories; and 
finally Leonard Ray, who devised a party categorization system that was designed to be 
more quantitative and examine larger numbers of parties. While all of these theories 
provided excellent party categorizations, the Sussex school and its definition of hard and 
soft-Euroscepticism was more appropriate for this single case study.  
 In addition to describing and defining hard vs. soft-Euroscepticism, it is also vital to 
conceptualize and define populism; as this thesis claims that populist radical right parties 
are connected to the concept of Euroscepticism. Therefore, a definition of populism must 
                                                          
5 Ibid Location 192 
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be provided for this thesis. Benjamin Moffit’s conceptualization of populism will be the 
same definition that this thesis utilizes. In his book, “The Global Rise of Populism: 
Performance, Political Style, and Representation,” Moffit states that, “populism is a 
political style that is used by a wide range of actors across the world today.”6 He goes on to 
write that the parties that utilize this performance will often incorporate three major 
themes: appeal to the people vs. the elite; bad manners; and the threat of a crisis or threat.7 
As will be shown in this thesis, these are all tactics that EKRE employs, illustrating their 
populist credentials. 
 When analyzing the populism of EKRE, the researcher did not solely utilize 
interviews. Because Moffit’s conceptualization was used, it was not enough to solely 
examine the statements made by party members. In addition, the researcher examined 
public statements made by high ranking EKRE politicians. As Moffit states, populism is a 
political style. Therefore, their public statements must be analyzed in order to see how they 
perform in public, not just in one-on-one interviews. 
 The final concept that needs to be defined is the concept of nativism. Since this 
concept is one of the main ideas of the thesis, it is critical to define and conceptualize it in 
the context of this paper. For this thesis the definition of nativism will be provided by Hans 
Georg Betz. In his 2019 article, the author devises three ways to examine nativism: 
economic nativism, welfare chauvinism, and symbolic nativism.8 For this project, the 
conceptualization of nativism will be centered around the definition of symbolic nativism. 
The states that, “Symbolic nativism is centred on the defence of the fundamental traditions, 
values and historically evolved institutional arrangements that define a particular 
community, its culture and identity.”9 This is the form of nativism that is most appropriate 
                                                          
6 Benjamin Moffit, The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation (Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 2016) 28. 
7 Ibid 29 
8 Hans-Georg Betz, ‘Facets of Nativism: A Heuristic Exploration,’ Patterns of Prejudice 53 no.2, (2019) 111-
135, (pg.111) 
9 Ibid (pg.123). 
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for EKRE’s approach to the topic. Throughout the interviews, the politicians described the 
various cultural and identity issues that they perceived as threats to the country.   
 In order to accomplish the task in answering the two research questions, in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews were utilized. These were conducted with two high-level EKRE 
MPs, Martin Helme and Jaak Madison. These interviews were generally broken into four 
sections: background questions; questions regarding the Eurosceptic nature of the party; 
questions on society as a whole; and questions that concerned the policies of the party. 
Once these interviews were gathered, they were examined for specific phrases and 
statements and were then coded. There were three categories of codes used: Eurosceptic 
codes; nativist codes; and populist codes. In addition to these three categories, there were 
also statements made that were noteworthy, however they could not fit into one of the 
aforementioned categories. Therefore, they were coded as miscellaneous.  
Within these three categories the codes used are as follows. For the Eurosceptic 
category, the codes are hard-Euoscepticism and soft-Euroscepticism. These two codes are 
based on the conceptualizations devised by Taggart and Szczerbiak. For the nativist 
category, the codes are tradition, demographics, and sovreignity. These codes are 
associated with Betz’s idea of symbolic nativism. Finally, the populist category has the 
single code of populism. These codes were also accompanied by various sub-codes that 
were also identified in the interviews. Unlike the codes, there were no specific sub-codes 
that emerged. Rather, these sub-codes were small phrases or terms that directly emerged 
from certain quotations or were terms that summarized the sentiment of the phrase.  
This project will also attempt to address the various potential criticisms that can be 
placed on these interviews. The first major criticism is that only two interviews were 
conducted. Under many circumstances, this would be considered too small of a sample to 
draw valid conclusions. However, for this case specifically, this number of interviews is 
appropriate. Because EKRE is a far-right and populist party, it follows that it would have a 
very strict and hierarchical party structure. Therefore, it would only be beneficial to 
interview the top echelon of the party, rather than lower ranking or ordinary members. 
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Other criticisms that this technique can face is that the participants are being interviewed in 
their second language. However, both of the subjects interviewed speak excellent English 
and the use of a translator would have potentially inhibited proper analysis of the language 
used by the subjects.  
The thesis will be organized in the following manner. The first chapter will provide 
background information to the reader. The current political parties of Estonia will be 
discussed as will Estonian views on the European Union. More importantly, the reader will 
be provided with a brief history of EKRE and the major positions that it takes as a party. 
The background information is the first chapter because the reader needs to have this basic 
information before being exposed to the more theoretical aspects of this paper. The next 
chapter will be the literature review. This section will serve two purposes. The first is to 
present the existing literature on the topic. This will serve to show where the gaps in the 
literature exist and how this thesis plans to fill them in. The second role of this chapter is to 
conceptualize the various terms that are key to this project. 
Once the literature has been presented, the methodology chapter will follow. The 
section devoted to methodology will explain how coding was used to gather information 
from the interviews that were conducted. The definitions and explanations of the codes will 
be discussed in this chapter as well. It will also justify the techniques used in this thesis. 
The fourth chapter will briefly showcase the results of the coding. This will lay out how 
many times in each interview the interviewees mentioned one of the codes that had been 
defined in the methodology chapter. The fifth chapter will be used to analyze the results of 
the interviews. This will utilize texts from the literature review and texts outside of the 
literature review. The thesis will then conclude with a brief concluding section that will 
summarize the findings of the thesis and will present areas that can be expanded for further 
research. 
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CHAPTER 1: Background Information 
Introduction 
 Before discussing the research design, literature review, and the results of this 
paper, it is necessary to provide the reader with some background regarding both the 
Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE) and on Estonian politics in general. While 
there has been an increase in the number of English texts that examine EKRE, there are 
still some gaps in the literature that this thesis will fill. This chapter will briefly explain the 
history and current makeup of Estonian politics, and, more importantly, how EKRE came 
to power and its performance in the previous elections. As this section of the thesis will 
illustrate, the creation and popularity of this party was never a forgone conclusion. In fact, 
before the rise of EKRE, there had not been a major Eurosceptic party in the country since 
its accession to the EU. Before EKRE’s meteoric rise, Estonian politics was dominated by 
the center-right, center-left, and the center parties. All of these political bodies were pro-
European Union and Estonia, along with Poland, was seen as consistently in favor of 
European policies. As previously stated in the introductory chapter, that is why it is so vital 
to examine a single country as a case study and to specifically examine EKRE in order to 
see what specific context allowed for its rise in prominence. That is why it is important to 
give the reader necessary background information regarding the country and the party 
itself.  
This chapter will be divided in to six main subsections: The current parties in the 
parliament; a history of the EKRE party; the structure of the party; a comparison with 
similar parties in the region; problems facing Estonian society; and Estonian views of the 
EU.   
The Major Parties in Estonia 
 The Republic of Estonia is currently home to five political parties that are 
represented in the parliament. Before dissecting and further analyzing the Conservative 
People’s Party of Estonia, the other prominent parties of Estonia will be briefly discussed. 
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This will help the reader contextualize the rise of EKRE within the country of Estonia. The 
two largest parties in the country are the Reform Party and the Center Party. The Reform 
Party is currently the largest party in the Estonian parliament and is best characterized as a 
classically liberal party. The party believe in lower income taxes and that the free market is 
the best key for Estonia to see success on the global stage.10 On the other hand, the Center 
Party does advocate for more state intervention in the economy.11 Additionally, this party, 
as part of its message, tries to appeal to the “interests of the less well-off population and the 
national minorities.”12 This has meant that the Center Party was typically classified as the 
party for the Russian-speaking population.13  
 A key piece of information to note is that the Center Party was the only party in 
Estonia to not fully endorse accession to the EU. As Evald Mikkel and Geoffrey Pridham 
write, in Estonia and Latvia, almost every party wished to join the EU.14 The only 
exception was the Center Party in Estonia. They write, “both countries evidenced strong 
cross-party and elite support for EU accession, the main exception being the Centre Party 
in Estonia, which was deeply divided and ambivalent on the EU issue.”15 This illustrates 
that Estonia has had a party that was hesitant about its membership in the EU before 
EKRE.  
 The other two parties in the Estonian Parliament are Isamaa and the Social 
Democratic Party. These two parties are the fourth and fifth largest parties, respectively. 
Isamaa is a conservative party (though not as far to the right as EKRE). This is reflected in 
their desire to establish a voting system in the country whereby families with children will 
                                                          
10 ‘Estonian Reform Party Faction,’ Riigikogu, < https://www.riigikogu.ee/en/parliament-of-
estonia/factions/estonian-reform-party-faction/> [Accessed March 27, 2019] 
11 Estonian Centre Party Faction, Riigikogu, < https://www.riigikogu.ee/en/parliament-of-
estonia/factions/estonian-centre-party-faction/> [Accessed March 27, 2019] 
12 ibid 
13 Tonis Saarts, ‘Persistence and Decline of Political Parties: the Case of Estonia,’ East European Politics, 31 
no.2 (2015) 208-228, (pg.216) 
14 Evald Mikkel and Geoffrey Pridham, ‘Clinching the ‘Return to Europe’: The Refereundums on EU 
Accession in Estonia and Latvia,’ West European Politics, 27 no.4 (2004) 716-748, (pg. 717). 
15 Ibid 717 
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receive a more heavily weighted vote in elections.16 This would be designed to promote 
families and maintain a high proportion of Estonians in the country. The final party, the 
Social Democrats, are a left-of-center party. They want to “improv[e] the situation of 
children and families with children, eliminat[e] salaried poverty, and improv[e] social 
coherence.”17 This would imply that the party wants to establish a strong social security net 
for the Estonian population. All of the parties mentioned are pro-EU. 
The History of EKRE  
The Conservative People’s Party of Estonia was established relatively recently. Yet 
despite this, the party has quickly gained popularity within the country of Estonia. The 
origins of the party can be traced to the mid-2000s. One of the creators of the party, Martin 
Helme, stated that, “in 2006 we joined with like-minded people and formed a pressure 
group, an activist group that centered around the debate on what to do with soviet 
monuments.”18 As stated by Martin Helme, this movement was created largely from the 
crisis surrounding the Bronze Soldier controversy in 2007.19 This organization existed as a 
pressure group until the early 2010s. At this time, the movement joined forces with the old 
People’s Union Party to officially create what is now known as the Conservative People’s 
Party of Estonia in 2012.20 Once one of the largest and most popular parties in Estonia, the 
People’s Union was rocked by a series of scandals in the early 21st century that saw its 
popularity drastically decrease. The party soon, “saw its ranks fall to fourth in 2011 [and it] 
failed to make the 5 percent threshold. Percentages in popularity polls [had] been in the 
low single-digit figures.”21  
                                                          
16 ‘Isamaa Faction’, Riigikogu, <https://www.riigikogu.ee/en/parliament-of-estonia/factions/isamaa-faction/> 
[Accessed March 27, 2019]  
17 ‘Social Democratic Party Faction,’Riigikogu, < https://www.riigikogu.ee/en/parliament-of-
estonia/factions/social-democratic-party-faction/> [Accessed May 7, 2019] 
18 Martin Helme, Interview with Daniel Jarosak (Riigikogu, Interviewed on January 24th, 2019). 
19 Helme, Interview 
20 Ott Tammik, ‘People’s Union Becomes ‘Conservative People’s Party.’ ERR, (March 26th, 2012) 
<https://news.err.ee/103747/people-s-union-becomes-conservative-people-s-party> [Accessed May 6, 2019] 
21 ibid 
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 After the party formed, it ran in all of the major elections in the country between 
2013-2019. Martin Helme, in his interview, described what each election results meant for 
the party:  
Our…first elections, when we ran in local elections in 2013, it wasn’t 
particularly successful. It was an opportunity… to try out what worked and 
what didn’t work and try to mobilize our forces. So then came the 2014 EP 
elections which went better, but because the threshold is so high, we didn’t 
get a mandate. And then the 2017 local elections came and went about how 
we expected. It wasn’t a screaming success, but we were quite happy with 
the results. And I forgot about the 2015 parliamentary elections, which no 
one thought that we would succeed but we surprised them.22 
The timeline that is described by Martin Helme is backed up by the results of each 
elections. The rise in popularity of EKRE has been noteworthy. This is especially evident 
in the 2015 parliamentary elections in which the party gained 8.1% of the seats in the 
Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament).23 For a two-year-old party competing in its first elections, 
this is a very successful outcome. This result was improved upon in 2019 when the party 
won 19% of the seats in parliament.24  
As stated in the introductory chapter, EKRE is a populist radical right party, and 
therefore holds many views and supports various policies that are popular with parties that 
are on the political right. Specifically, it promotes policies in relation to Europe that are 
very common amongst other far-right parties. One of the most prominent policies is the 
idea of retaking control of Estonia’s borders. As parliament member Jaak Madisson states, 
“if we want to restore the border controls, we must get permission from the European 
Commission and if we don’t get it, we can’t get it. And for most member states, it is 
problematic that you have to ask the EC to restore your border control.”25  
                                                          
22 Helme, Interview. 
23 ‘Conservative People’s Party of Estonia Faction.’  
24 Ibid  
25 Jaak Madison, Interview with Daniel Jarosak (Riigikogu. Interviewed on January 14th, 2019). 
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Another aspect of this party is the emphasis on family and conservative values. The 
party’s official web page on the Parliamentary website highlights this belief in two ways. 
The first is that, “The Party also wants to introduce a group of measures that would 
increase the birth rate of Estonians.”26 The second is that, “The Conservative People’s 
Party wants to repeal the Cohabitation Act.”27 The Cohabitation Act allows same-sex 
couples to officially register with the Estonian government.28 As will be discussed later in 
the thesis, these beliefs and policies illustrate a party that is greatly concerned with 
demographics. This also illustrates, along with their MP’s rhetoric, that this is a party that 
is not supportive of diversity or multiculturalism.  
The third major talking point for EKRE is the issue of language. This is related to 
the previous points and is rooted in the desire to preserve the Estonian nation. The party 
explicitly states on its parliamentary page that its desire is to preserve, “the vitality of the 
Estonian values…language, culture…traditions.”29 This point is then further expounded 
upon by Jaak Madison who stated, when asked about the issue of language that,  
“we have to start from Kindergarten. There has to be the same school 
program. It cannot be like the US where the Mexicans are only speaking 
Spanish and don’t learn English. Or like in Germany where you have 
different school systems that you can learn only in Turkish and not German. 
But this is the problem that we have in Estonia.”30 
This illustrates the fear that the Estonian people and their language and culture can become 
endangered if minorities are not assimilated or are not restricted from entering the country. 
However, this is not to say that EKRE opposes ethnic Russians and Russian speaking 
individuals from joining its ranks. However, is more transactional in its motivation. Louis 
Wierenga cites Ruuben Kaalep who stated that, “whenever two white nations together face 
                                                          
26 ‘Conservative People’s Party of Estonia Faction.’ 
27 Ibid 
28 ‘Riigikogu approved Cohabitation Act,’ Riigikogu (October 9th, 2014), 
<https://www.riigikogu.ee/en/sitting-reviews/riigikogu-approved-cohabitation-act/> [accessed May 18, 2019] 
29 ‘Conservative People’s Party of Estonia Faction.’ 
30 Jaak Madison, Interview. 
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something that is not white, they will see that eventually it is better to work together.”31 
This refers to the Muslim minority in Estonia. So, while language is a major issue for 
EKRE, this does not mean that the party will exclude Russians from its ranks when 
confronted with an ‘alien’ entity.  
The Rise of EKRE in the Context the Baltic Sea Region  
 The rise of EKRE is part of a Eurosceptic revival that is prominent throughout 
Europe. The Baltic Sea region is no exception to this. It would be beneficial to examine 
other far-right parties in the Baltic Sea region and see how EKRE compares to them in both 
style and policy. The first major right-wing party that has become prominent in the Baltic 
region is the True Finns party, of Finland. The elections of 2011 proved to be a massive 
year for the party. As Mark Niemi writes, “The parliamentary group… now suddenly grew 
to 39 members. At the same time the party fractured the traditional configuration of three 
main parties and became the third-largest party in the Parliament.”32 Today, the party 
currently holds 38 seats in the parliament (around 17%).33 The party’s website states that, 
“The Finns Party platform and policy is built on the work ethic, entrepreneurship, and a 
balanced social welfare system linked to Christian values. The Party has support from all 
sectors of the political spectrum.”34 The party is also hesitant when it comes to 
immigration. Their pamphlet on their immigration party writes that, “Actual outcomes of 
these [immigration] factors can be seen in the many riots, brutal events, and the formation 
of violent gangs in a number of large European cities.”35 
 Another party that should be examined is the National Alliance in Latvia. This 
party is slightly older than EKRE, having found electoral success in 2011 rather than 
                                                          
31 Louis Wierenga, ‘Russians, Refugees, and Europeans: What Shapes the Discourse of the Conservative 
People’s Party of Estonia?,’ Uptake working paper, no.6 (2017) 1-20, (pg.15). 
32 Mari K. Niemi, ‘The True Finns Identity Politics and Populist Leadership on the Threshold of the Party’s 
Electoral Triumph,’ Javnost-The Republic, 20 no.3 (2013) 77-91, (pg.78). 
33Parliamentary Elections 2019,’ Finns Party in English, <https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/kielisivu/in-
english/> [Accessed. May 30th, 2019] 
34 Ibid 
35 Finns Party, The Finns Party’s Immigration Policy, <https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/ps_immigration_final.pdf> [Accessed April 30th, 2019] (pg.1) 
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2015.36 Despite this difference in age, both parties have rather similar stances. For instance, 
the NA advocates for, “traditional marriage and advocating liberal spending on benefits for 
families with children (the “demography” issue – low ethnic Latvian birth rates – has been 
a major issue for the party).”37 Additionally, it has declared that, “it will never support or 
join a government that involves Harmony” (the Harmony party is a prominent political 
party in Latvia that is popular amongst its Russian minority).38 This all is similar to EKRE 
who’s policies are also focused on the demographics of their home country and view 
Russia with intense suspicion.  
 What these parties all showcase is that the region is experiencing the same issues 
that plague the other states of the EU. What’s more, the region itself is highly 
heterogeneous, with old EU member states, new EU member states, and countries of 
varying sizes. Yet, despite these numerous differences, almost every country in the region 
has at least one notable and influential right-wing party. However, what is interesting to 
note is that both Estonia and Latvia saw their main Eurosceptic parties emerge later than 
their sister parties both in the region and in the continent as a whole.  
Perceived Problems Currently Facing Estonian Society: 
 This subchapter will mainly focus on the issues that EKRE and its supporters view 
as being potentially harmful to the country of Estonia. One theme that emerges from this is 
the issue of language. Throughout the interviews with the MPs, the issue of language was 
brought up a number of times. For instance, in his interview, Jaak Madison told how 
Russian-speaking individuals needed to be more integrated into the population.39 This fear 
over language gives EKRE ammunition to target members of the Russian-speaking 
population. The party is able to frame the population as being one composed of patriots, 
                                                          
36 Juris Kaza, ‘Who is Who in Upcoming Latvian Parliamentary Elections,’ Re:Baltica, (Re:Baltica August 
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[Accessed April 30th, 2019] 
37 Ibid 
38 Ibid 
39 Helme, Interview 
   
 
14 
 
disinterested individuals, and pro-Kremlin supporters.40 This, of course, gives the 
impression that the Russian-speaking population presents a challenge to society.  
 The second problem is rooted in demographics. With around 1.3 million citizens, 
Estonia’s entire total population is around half of the population of Warsaw. As an 
ethnicity, Estonians constitute over 900,000 citizens in Estonia that makes up around 75% 
of the state. What is interesting, however, is that it is one of the few former communist 
countries in the area that is not experiencing a decline in population. Unlike Poland, 
Russia, and the other two Baltic states, Estonia has seen a modest increase in its 
population.41 However, while the overall population has increased, the actual number of 
ethnic Estonians is decreasing. According to Estonian Statistics, in 2013 the number of 
ethnic Estonians in the country was 912,188 however in 2017, that number had fallen to 
904,639 (the population was falling yearly in between these two measures).42 Meanwhile, 
net migration to Estonia has been increasing, meaning that non-ethnic Estonians are 
becoming a more noticeable fraction of the population.43 
 Of course, an increasing population that is either foreign-born or not part of the 
ethnic majority is not necessarily a negative event. In fact, most economists would laud this 
trend as it can provide more working age citizens. However, for certain segments of the 
population, this can be perceived as a threat. This sentiment is captured by Martin Helme 
when he states,  
“demographic sense to make sure that the that both the number and the 
proportion of Estonians in EE is increased that we will grow as a nation and 
we will be in an increasing majority and when we are talking about the 
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Russians in EE or the Ukrainians in EE…it would be nice if we had a 
negative but at least as small immigration as possible.”44 
This demography controversy is thus an issue for EKRE and the various Estonian citizens 
who support the party. This is not unique to EKRE as various other far-right parties 
throughout Europe and the Baltic Sea region focus heavily on ensuring that an ethnic 
majority is maintained. For instance, in Poland, the ruling PiS party both implements 
policies that are designed to promote traditional families and child rearing and espouses 
rhetoric as well. Their “Family 500+” policy is designed to promote women to have more 
children, in return for cash incentives.45 Additionally, former Prime Minister Beata Szydlo 
has publicly stated that Family, development and security are the three pillars of our 
governance.”46 As will be discussed later in this paper, EKRE’s Euroscepticism is, in-part, 
based on this fear of demographic shifts.  
Estonian Views of the EU  
 Of course, it is important to examine how Estonians view the European Union in 
the present day. While the country has elected a string of pro-EU governments into power, 
it would be misguided to assume that all Estonians are completely enthusiastic about 
Brussels and the direction the EU is taking. Firstly, when examining how Estonians view 
the European Union as a whole, according to the 2018 Eurobarometer survey, 53% of 
Estonians trust the EU; a number that is 11% higher than the EU average.47 This coincides 
with the idea that Estonians have a highly favorable view towards the European Union and 
trust the decision making process that occurs in Brussels. This is supported further by the 
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fact that 78% of Estonian citizens believe that they are also citizens of the European Union; 
a full eight points higher than the EU average.48  
This amount of support for the European project is by no means an outlier. This 
measure has been part of an upward trend for the past 15 years since the country first 
joined the bloc in 2004. In the 62nd Eurobarometer (taken in 2004), the percent of 
Estonians who believed that membership was beneficial was 52%, which was a 21% 
increase between spring and autumn of that year.49 This would further increase in 2007. By 
the end of that year, approval of the EU increased further to 66%.50 In 2013, Estonians 
largely trusted the EU with 64% saying they fully trusted the future of the EU and only 
33% not believing in the future of the EU.51 What this illustrates is that, by-and-large, the 
country largely supports the EU and shows no real sign of trying to leave the bloc.  
Thus, it must be asked, how and why EKRE has been able to conjure up so much 
support despite Estonians’ strong support for the EU? One of the ways is that the party 
itself does not explicitly say that it wants to remove Estonia from the union. Additionally, 
even the most Eurosceptic members of the party, who reject the European Union and what 
it represents, admit that their stance is not representative of the party as a whole (this will 
be examined further in the thesis). Another answer can be found in one of the 
Eurobarometer questions from 2018. That question is “what do you think are the two most 
important issues facing the EU at the moment?” Here, Estonians rank their two biggest 
fears as immigration (65%) and terrorism (25%).52 
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 These numbers are crucial, especially when you take into account that only 13% of 
Estonians believe that the economic situation is one of the two biggest issues facing the 
country (however 44% believe that inflation and rising prices are the biggest issues facing 
the country and these can be seen as economic concerns).53 Overall, it would be a mistake 
to attribute the rise of EKRE to solely to economic issues or solely to the idea that certain 
segments of society feel left behind economically. Rather, as this thesis will show, social 
and cultural issues play a far greater role in the rise of this party. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, the background information surrounding EKRE has been discussed 
and analyzed. It is important to provide context to the rise of EKRE. Firstly, this requires 
that a brief description of the political parties of Estonia. By the time the EKRE came into 
being in 2013, the various parties in Estonia were pro-EU parties and a consistently pro-EU 
government was in place. This chapter expediently describes the major parties that are 
represented in the Riigikogu. With the exception of EKRE, the vast majority of parties are 
pro-EU and pursue relatively liberal policies. It would be these moderate parties that would 
dominate the Estonian political arena. However, this would not last.  
As the brief history of the Conservative People’s Party shows, the party was able to 
emerge from humble beginnings and exploit certain feelings within the society. This rise of 
a relatively outsider party came as great surprise in 2015.  Even during the financial crisis 
of 2008 and the period of economic stagnation between 2009-2013, Estonia did not have a 
notable far right party. Instead, this thesis will illustrate that it was a series of cultural and 
ethnic issues and concerns are what propelled this party into the prominent position that it 
currently finds itself in. After the 2019 parliamentary elections, EKRE saw its support 
further expand and its representation went from 8% to 19%.  
Estonia is not the only country that has experienced this recent trend. Throughout 
the 2010s, there has been a rise of parties that are hostile towards Brussels and European 
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integration. Consequently, it is necessary to examine other far right parties that are similar 
to EKRE in order to give a wider European context as to how this party compares to its 
fellow Eurosceptic organizations. The prominent anti-EU parties of Latvia and Finland 
were analyzed. While the parties analyzed should not be viewed as homogenous entities 
(especially in regards to foreign policy), they both look to address cultural fears in their 
respective countries. 
This, in part, helps illuminate why a single-case study is necessary when dissecting 
this party. By using this research method, it becomes clear which individual, country 
specific aspects, influenced the rise of this right-wing party. This thesis aims to examine 
these aspects and will uncover.  What becomes immediately apparent is that the sudden 
boom in popularity of this party in Estonia is rather surprising. This is a country that has 
been politically dominated by parties that are either fully supportive of or are at least 
sympathetic to the European project.  
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CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 
Introduction:  
This chapter accomplishes two goals. The first is that it will define and 
conceptualize the main concepts that will dominate this thesis. In total, there are three main 
concepts that must be defined in this chapter. They are: Euroscepticism, party-based 
Euroscepticism, and Euroscepticism fueled by nativist factors. In order to conceptualize the 
idea of Euroscepticism, Clive Archer and his examination of Euroscepticism in the Nordics 
will be examined. Within the field of party-based Euroscepticism, there are four main 
branches: the North Carolina School of party-based Euroscepticism (devised by Leonard 
Ray), Sofia Vasilopolou’s three categories of Eurosceptic parties, Kopecky and Mudde’s 
categorization of parties, and the Sussex School of party-based Euroscepticism (advocated 
by Taggart and Szczerbiak). While all of these theories provide their own advantages and 
disadvantages Taggart and Szczerbiak’s definition will provide the backbone for this 
thesis. The idea of nativist influences on party-based Euroscepticism will be 
conceptualized using the definition created by Hans-Georg Betz.  
The second goal of this literature review will be to explore what the existing 
literature has to say about both Euroscepticism as a whole, and in Estonia specifically. This 
review will illustrate that there is a lack of literature dedicated to EKRE’s policies and how 
Euroscepticism fuels its nativism. As previously stated in the introduction, it is vital to 
study why this party has been able to gain so much influence in a country that is 
traditionally seen as broadly supportive of EU integration and the European project. This 
chapter will showcase how this thesis will contribute to the existing literature by filling in 
the gaps left by the articles and theories already crafted by different academics. 
A key concept in this thesis is that EKRE is a populist radical right party that 
incorporates a hard-Eurosceptic message. Cas Mudde writes of populist radical right states 
that, “The key feature of the populist radical right ideology is nativism: an ideology which 
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holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native groups.”54 As 
will be illustrated later in this thesis, EKRE’s hard-Eurosceptic stance is fueled by the 
nativism that is described by Cas Mudde. It is therefore necessary to not only examine the 
Eurosceptic rhetoric that motivates EKRE, but the populist rhetoric as well.  
This chapter will further make the connection between far-right parties and 
populism later and in greater detail, highlighting an article composed by Margarita Gomez-
Reino and Ivan Llamazares. While the point of this thesis is to examine EKRE’s 
Eurosceptic policies, only examining literature based on Euroscepticism will not give the 
whole picture. It is necessary to explore literature that explains the connection to populist 
radical right parties and Eurosceptic rhetoric. The main theories on populism that will be 
discussed are ones crafted by Benjamin Moffit and Cas Mudde. These two scholars have 
crafted texts the help define what populism is and how it functions in contemporary 
society. While Cas Mudde confirms that Euroscepticism is a key aspect of populist radical 
right parties, it will be Benjamin Moffit’s conceptualization of the concept (that populism 
is a style of politics) that will form the backbone of this thesis. This is necessary in order to 
see how this paper should define populism and how it applies to the EKRE political party.   
This chapter will be divided into six main sub-sections. The first will briefly 
address the two main forms of party-based Euroscepticism. The next section will discuss 
the articles that further conceptualize Euroscepticism. The third section will address why 
party-based Euroscepticism is the best form of Euroscepticism to utilize. The following 
subchapter is devoted to examining literature reviewing Euroscepticism in Estonia. 
Afterwards, the fifth section will address the various academic articles devoted to 
populism. The chapter will end with a brief summarizing of the main points made and a 
statement of the argument of this thesis. 
The Different Forms of Party-Based Euroscepticism 
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Before going deeper into the ideas of party-based Euroscepticism, the broader ideas 
of Euroscepticism must be defined and conceptualized. In order to broadly define this term, 
this paper will look at the definition composed by Clive Archer in his text, “Euroscepticism 
in the Nordic Region.” While examining the four Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, and Finland) the author broadly defines the idea of Euroscepticism. In his article, 
he writes, “Euroscepticism is judged in the Nordic region in terms of the acceptance by 
various groups of particular levels of integration.”55 He goes on to break down the intensity 
of opposition to integration ranging from the highest opposition (the EU should only be a 
free-trade area) to the lowest level of opposition to integration (a federal European state).56 
Euroscepticism, consequently, will be conceptualized in this way, as opposition to 
European integration.   
This is used because Estonia is similar to these four countries economically; all of 
these countries rely heavily on trade and being open markets. Therefore, these countries 
must be connected to Europe in some way shape or form. Like these countries, Estonia 
could not exit the EU in the same manner as England. Therefore, even a Eurosceptic party 
such as EKRE cannot advocate for a full divorcing with the EU due to both the heavy 
reliance on the organization and its popularity at home. Conceptualizing Euroscepticism as 
being fully opposed to the EU (and wanting to leave) would be inappropriate in the context 
of Estonia. As a result, Archer’s conceptualization of the term is best suited for Estonia and 
this thesis. 
As Euroscepticism has been defined, it is now necessary to conceptualize party-
based Euroscepticism. This involves examining different political parties and attempting to 
categorize them based on how Eurosceptic they are. While Archer has created a way to 
classify how Eurosceptic a party is, he does not devise a set of categories to sort these 
parties. There are, however, various groups of authors have attempted to define this term 
and provide a way to categorize certain parties based on how Eurosceptic they are. These 
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six authors are Paul Taggart, Aleks Szczerbiak, Petr Kopecky, Cas Mudde, Leonard Ray, 
and Sofia Vasilopoulou. Taggart and Szczerbiak designed what is known as the Sussex 
school of party-based Euroscepticism, while Ray created the North Carolina school of 
party based Euroscepticism. Kopecky and Mudde devised their own definition and 
categorization of political parties as a count er to Taggart and Szczerbiak’s model. Finally, 
Vasilopoulou divided the types of Eurosceptic parties into three distinct categories in an 
attempt to improve upon the shortcomings of both the Sussex school and Kopecky and 
Mudde’s categorization of Eurosceptic parties. 
   For this thesis, Taggart and Szczerbiak’s conceptualization of party-based 
Euroscepticism will be utilized. The roots of the Taggart, Szczerbiak idea of 
Euroscepticism can be traced back to 2000 when they divided parties into “hard 
Eurosceptic” parties and “soft Eurosceptic” parties. They define hard-Euroscepticism as 
“where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore 
can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or 
whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of 
European integration as it is currently conceived.”57 On the other hand, soft-
Euroscepticism is defined as, “where there is a not a principled objection to European 
integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas 
lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU.”58 These two academics utilize 
qualitative research methods in order to reach their conclusions. This involves examining 
party rhetoric and writings. As Mudde notes in his article, Taggart and Szczerbiak state 
that, “‘In measuring how Eurosceptical a party is, we therefore suggested focusing on a 
party’s public statements, the parliamentary voting on key European issues (treaties), and 
published party programmes/manifestos’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a, p. 9).”59 The two 
authors created two texts in order to fully flush out their conception of Euroscepticism. The 
two texts are “Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism,” 
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volumes one and two. Volume one focuses mostly one case studies while volume two 
discusses the theoretical frameworks of Euroscepticism. While the first volume is very well 
done and contains many important observations (Estonia was one of the countries 
examined), the second volume will be more closely examined. The most important chapter 
in this text comes at the end of the text. This is where Taggart and Szczerbiak outline the 
problems that plague the process of defining Euroscepticism. 
 This is an important segment because it illustrates why there is so much confusion 
surrounding the term and its application. They write that one of the key ideas to remember 
is that, “definitions of party-based Euroscepticism are not over-inclusive and should refer 
specifically to party attitudes towards the European Union in principle and the EU’s 
current or future trajectory.”60 This clarification is a direct response to the various claims 
that have been made against their categorization of Eurosceptic parties, especially by 
Kopecky and Mudde. This chapter is also useful in that it helps explain and further clarify 
the terms hard and soft-Euroscepticism as defined by Taggart and Szczerbiak. It is partly 
because of this increased clarification that the Sussex School of party-based 
Euroscepticism is the best research method for this thesis. 
 Despite the clarifications made by Taggart and Szczerbiak, there are still authors 
who believe that this conceptualization requires further work or have developed their own 
way to categorize these parties. It is important to examine these theories, to both 
investigate the literature on the subject, and to look at their flaws and why they were not 
considered for this paper. As alluded to earlier, one pair of authors emerged to challenge 
Taggart and Szczerbiak’s categorization of Eurosceptic parties. Those two authors are Petr 
Kopecky and Cas Mudde. Like Taggart and Szczerbiak, the two authors examine each 
party using qualitative methods. However, these authors state that they define 
Euroscepticism as, “less inclusively, yet more precisely…by distinguishing between 
‘diffuse’ and ‘specific’ support for European integration.”61 The authors go on to define 
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diffuse support as supporting general ideas of European integration and specific support as 
supporting the practice of European integration.62 These two devised a new categorization 
of Euroscepticism that has four separate classes to arrange political parties. They are: Euro-
enthusiasts, Euro-pragmatist, Eurosceptic, and Euro-reject.63 These groups are categorized 
by whether they are a combination of Europhile, EU-optimistic, Europhobe, and EU-
pessimist.64 In Kopecky and Mudde’s research of Euroscepticism, the authors examine the 
eastern European states of Hungary, Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia (the Visegrad four 
countries).  
 The question that then inevitably arises is, how is Taggart and Szczerbiak’s 
categorization of Eurosceptic parties still valid if this theory works to improve upon its 
predecessor? Kopecky and Mudde have devised a definition that utilizes more categories, 
is more precise in defining what a “Eurosceptic” party is and takes into account diffuse and 
specific support for the EU. However, there are still valid criticisms that can be levelled 
against this categorization of Euroscepticism. The first, and most prominent criticism, is 
that the categories created by these two can oftentimes lead to some uncomfortable 
pairings. For instance, the PiS party (Poland’s current ruling, Eurosceptic party) is placed 
in the Eurosceptic category of their spectrum.65 While this may seem to be the correct 
placement, the actual way in which the authors define Euroscepticism creates some issues.  
Kopecky and Mudde claim that Eurosceptic parties are still Europhiles. However, 
even PiS’s more “Europhilic” statements are couched in the idea that Europe must be a 
primarily white, Christian entity. Another issue is that some of the categories are somewhat 
contradictory. For instance, the “Euro-pragmatist” category can prove confusing. Since it 
describes parties that are “Europhobe” as still being “EU-optimist,” confusion can arise as 
to what parties belong in this section based on their policies.66 This is a sentiment echoed 
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by Taggart and Szczerbiak in their second volume regarding Euroscepticism.67 Another 
criticism brought forward by Taggart and Szczerbiak is that the term “Euro-enthusiast” is 
too broad. They write, “Kopecky and Mudde’s default ‘Euro-enthusiast’ category is too 
inclusive and does not capture the full range of approaches to the EU that are encompassed 
within it.”68 Once again, this leads to categorizations of parties into the same group despite 
having widely different views on Europe and European integration. 
 The main source of data for the Sussex school and Kopecky and Mudde’s theory is 
“qualitative analysis of party positions.”69 Mudde notes that a major issue that arises from 
this is that different authors, when using this definition of Euroscepticism, could come to 
different conclusions when examining the same parties.70 However, this leaves a potential 
gap that can be filled by this thesis. This is due to the fact that this thesis utilizes interviews 
with party members, instead of only analyzing party literature. This can bring a different 
perspective to the theory by receiving information directly from party figures. While this 
still proves the problem of consistency (researchers could interview different politicians or 
politicians could provide different answers to the same questions), it does solve the issue of 
subjective interpretation. This is attributable to the fact that the views and opinions are 
coming directly from those who shape party policy. This means there is room for 
interpretation that comes with examining speeches and party literature. This thesis, 
therefore, works to help shore up the validity and reliability of the measurements used in 
the Sussex school of party-based Euroscepticism. 
One author who attempted to ameliorate the problems of both the Sussex-school 
and Kopecky and Mudde’s theory is Sofia Vasilopoulou. She created three categories to 
place parties that utilize Eurosceptic language: the rejecting type, the conditional type, and 
the compromising type. In regards to rejecting parties, she writes, “rejecting’ type consists 
of parties that are against the principle of ceding national sovereignty to non-national 
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institutions and utterly disapprove of… enhanced legislation at the EU level.”71 The second 
classification of parties is the “conditional” group of parties. These parties, “acknowledge 
that the principle of cooperation in Europe at a multilateral level is…beneficial…but for 
them unification is detrimental to the interests and the sovereignty of their country.”72 The 
final category this author lays out is the compromising party. In order to be placed in this 
group, a party, “compromised their position to recognize that a degree of power transfer to 
supranational institutions, while not politically desirable, is necessary in order to achieve 
economic prosperity.”73 In order to gather the necessary data for this conceptualization, the 
author uses the research first developed by Benoit and Laver, who examined party 
literature by taking data from the Comparative Manifesto Project.74 
 Vasilopoulou devises a thorough categorization for Eurosceptic parties. Like 
Kopecky and Mudde, she tries to improve upon the apparent weakness of the Sussex 
School of party-based Euroscepticism: its over-generalizations. However, Vasilopoulou 
comes closer to improving upon the Sussex school than Kopecky and Mudde. The 
categories that she creates avoid the confusing and contradictory nature of Kopecky and 
Mudde’s categorizations. There are still areas that must be addressed when examining her 
theory. The main problem emerges when she writes, “The main findings of the article are 
that first, parties that ‘reject‘ European integration are highly authoritarian.”75 EKRE 
stands out as a party that in many ways, based on their based on their rhetoric, reject many 
aspects of the EU and political integration. However, they do not possess this anti-
democratic essence (as they advocate for direct democracy). 
 The North Carolina School of party-based Euroscepticism represents a different 
way to categorize political parties. This form of analysis was initially devised by Leonard 
Ray in 1999. A key aspect of this research is that unlike the Sussex school of party-based 
Euroscepticism, this form of analysis uses the opinion of experts when analyzing a party’s 
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position on European integration. Another key aspect, as Mudde states, is that, “The data of 
the North Carolina School are both its strength and weakness. Its strength…is that the 
dataset is longitudinal, quantitative, and easily accessible. Its weakness is the source of the 
data, i.e. the so-called ‘experts’ that fill out the surveys.”76 Of course, this weakness occurs 
due to the fact that it is difficult to replicate the findings of a study. Because “expert” can 
include a relatively large number of individuals, it is possible that one researcher can ask 
one group of “experts” while another individual asks a different set of individuals. This can 
lead to a party (or set of parties) being categorized differently in different research papers. 
Another drawback of this this technique is that it relies far more on quantitative analysis 
than the Sussex school does. Mudde even states himself that “the dataset is longitudinal 
[and] quantitative.”77 Additionally, another reason why the North Carolina School of party-
based Euroscepticism is not the best fit for this thesis is due to the scope of its research. As 
Mudde writes, “The North Carolina School also moved much further beyond party-based 
Euroscepticism… most study (also) Euroscepticism at the mass level (i.e. individual 
attitudes) and in the media (notably newspapers).”78 Seeing that this paper will only 
examine one party in one state, the Sussex school of party-based Euroscepticism is the 
more appropriate conceptualization.  
Nativism and party-based Euroscepticism 
While the previous section discussed the theories that helped outline the different 
categories of Euroscepticism, further conceptualization must be done in order to further 
flesh out the term Euroscepticism. This section will examine articles that discuss the 
motivations for populist radical right and Eurosceptic parties. While economics can play a 
role in the rise of these parties, it should not be viewed as the soul catalyst or the key 
component to this phenomenon. 
Before discussing the articles that address the nativist impacts on party-based 
Euroscepticism, this paper must illustrate what is meant by nativist effects on party-based 
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Euroscepticism. In this thesis, nativist effects will be conceptualized as thoughts or rhetoric 
that appeal to a specific ethnic group. More specifically, the threats that are posed to this 
ethnic group are what need to be thoroughly examined. These threats are: threats against 
demographics, traditional values, and sovreignity.  
As Hans-Georg Betz writes, there are three ways to look at the concept of nativism. 
These three facets are, 
“nativism, centred on the notion that jobs should be reserved for native 
citizens; welfare chauvinism, based on the notion that native citizens should 
be accorded absolute priority when it comes to social benefits; and symbolic 
nativism, advancing the notion that government should do everything to 
defend the cultural identity of a given national society.79  
For this thesis, the facet of “symbolic nativism” will provide the definition of nativism. In 
this form of nativism, the government’s duty is to isolate the country from any perceived 
aliens who threaten the cultural cohesion of a specific country. Throughout the interviews 
conducted for this thesis, the interview subjects framed their nativist inclinations around 
the idea that Estonia and its culture was under attack form the supranational ideas of the 
EU.   
However, there are authors who do not believe that nativism and immigration fears 
should not be used when explaining the rise of Euroscepticism. The first article that 
showcases this is, “Putting Brexit into perspective: the effect of the Eurozone and 
migration crises and Brexit on Euroscepticism in European states,” by Paul Taggart and 
Aleks Szczerbiak. The authors, in this piece of writing, frame four different aspects of 
modern Euroscepticism. Those four aspects are: economics, immigration, concerns over 
democracy and sovereignty, and national-specific concerns.80 While economics are 
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mentioned in this paper, many Eurosceptic parties possess different economic issues. This 
adds on to the idea that economic downturn is not the best predictor of Euroscepticism. 
Additionally, the paper states that the recent migrant controversies have not played a large 
role in the party politics of the Baltic states.81 This claim refutes the idea this thesis. As will 
be illustrated by this thesis, the idea of an alien group of people settling in Estonia helps 
fuel the Euroscepticism that is espoused by EKRE members. This suggests that, at the 
least, in the case of Estonia, nativist threats are an exception to this rule. 
The second article that refutes the idea of nativism playing a role in Euroscepticism 
is, “Going Soft or Staying Soft: Have Identity Factors Become More Important Than 
Economic Rationale When Explaining Euroscepticism,” by Marijn Van Klingeren, Hajo G. 
Boomgaarden, and Claes H. DeVreese. This article examined two periods of time (1994 
and 2005) to see how important economic and identity factors were in Eurosceptic 
sentiments within European populations. The article, like many other more current pieces 
of literature, states that economics play very little into Eurosceptic feelings. What is 
interesting is that the article states that “National pride and a possible increase of cultural 
threat (by immigrants) do not always lead to more Euroscepticism.”82 Once again, this 
thesis disagrees with this author’s findings. At least in the case of Estonia, EKRE bases 
much of their Eurosceptic attitudes around the idea that cultural threats could potentially 
infiltrate Estonia. Martin Helme even stated in his interview, “100 years ago there were a 
bit more than 100 Muslims in Holland and now there are 1.5 million. Things can change 
very rapidly.”83 This presents another gap that this thesis can potentially fill.  
While these various authors dispute the motivations behind Euroscepticism, one 
article presents the fact that Euroscepticism has been a facet of Europe for decades. That 
article is, “From Euroscepticism to Resistance to European Integration: An 
Interdisciplinary Perspective,” by Amandine Crespy and Nicolas Vershueren. These 
                                                          
81 Ibid (pg.1207) 
82 Marijan Van Klingeren, Hajo Boomgaarden and Claes DeVreese, ‘Going Soft or Staying Soft: Have 
Identity Factors Become More Important Than Econimic Rationale when Explaining Euroecepticism,’ 
Journal of European Integration 35 no.6 (2013) 689-704, (pg.701). 
83 Interview with Martin Helme 
   
 
30 
 
authors make the claim that while Euroscepticism has seen a marked increase over the 
years, it has always been a contentious and sensitive matter for the various states involved 
in the European project.84 This indicates that it is a concept that is immune to economic 
prosperity, as it has been a feature of politics even before the 2008 financial crisis. 
However, they argue that the idea of Euroscepticism must be reshaped and the term, 
“resistance” must be utilized instead.85 
Why Utilize Party-Based Euroscepticism: 
 There have been many articles that further support the claim that political parties 
are the driving force behind Euroscepticism. These articles serve to justify why party-based 
Euroscepticism is the optimal theory to utilize when analyzing support for the European 
project. It is necessary to briefly touch upon these articles because they serve to illustrate 
why party-based Euroscepticism is the driving source of analysis for this thesis rather than 
popular-based Euroscepticism. 
The first article that helps support the usage of party-based Euroscepticism is, 
“Does the Messenger Matter? A Comparison of the Effects of Eurosceptic Messages 
Communicated by Mainstream and Radical Right-Wing Parties on Citizens’ EU 
Attitudes,” by Michaela Maier, Silke Adam & Jürgen Maier. The article finds that 
individuals are most likely to take their cues from their political party and are more 
receptive to messages provided by their parties.86 It states that societies and people are 
more effected by Euroscepticism that is propagated by more mainstream parties.87 This 
supports the idea that the political parties are largely influential in creating a Eurosceptic 
attitude amongst a population and that as a party becomes more mainstream, it can create 
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more influence. This is crucial because it backs up the idea that it is the political party that 
is the driving force behind Euroscepticism. 
Another text that discusses Euroscepticism within the framework of political parties 
is “Europeanisation, Euroscepticism and Party Systems: Party-Based Euroscepticism in the 
Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe,” by Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak. In 
this article, the authors discuss the importance of political parties in both European 
integration and the rise in Euroscepticism. One of the main findings by the authors is that 
Euroscepticism has always been a feature in the political systems of the new member 
states.88 Once again, this reinforces the idea not only that Euroscepticism is not a new 
phenomenon, but also that political parties guide the Europeanization process and, 
therefore, the amount of Euroscepticism that a country experiences. 
While these articles serve to justify why the examination of political parties is 
important, it is also necessary to analyze why a party can become Eurosceptic. The piece 
“It takes two: how Eurosceptic public opinion and party divisions influence party 
positions,” by Jae-Jae Spoon and Christopher Williams helps shed light on to why this can 
occur. This article states that when parties are divided on the issue of European integration 
and have a constituency that is leaning more towards Euroscepticism, then that party will 
itself adopt a more Eurosceptic stance.89 While this article is useful for understanding 
party-based Euroscepticism, it only examines parties in power. Therefore, this thesis works 
to expand and aide this literature by examining a party that is still attempting to attain the 
power of high office.  
Another piece of Eurosceptic writing that examines how a party becomes 
Eurosceptic is, “Party based Euroscepticism and EU domestic coordination: longitudinal 
analysis of central and eastern countries,” by Petr Kaniok and Johana Galuskova. The main 
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argument of this article is that “the setup of a country’s central coordinating body, for 
instance, accurately indicates the manner in which its leading politicians view the 
European agenda.”90 They find that when a government centralizes its EU agenda, then it 
will more likely be Eurosceptic. This implies that high ranking government officials (such 
as presidents and prime ministers) are more willing to directly control the EU agenda, 
resulting in growing Euroscepticism.91 This article would serve this thesis by explaining 
why EKRE would want to control the European agenda if it were in power. In the 
interviews, if the subjects lean more towards directly controlling European policy. Also, it 
would be worth noting if EKRE has caused the ruling parties to directly interact with the 
European project more than in the past. 
Euroscepticism in Estonia 
Finally, the works that have been crafted that address the Euroscepticism in Estonia 
must be analyzed. It is important to examine how the existing theories and works devoted 
to Euroscepticism can be applied to Estonia. This will also help illuminate where the 
current literature on Euroscepticism in Estonia is lacking. The first article that examines 
this country is, “E’lite vs. People? Eurosceptic Public Opinion in Estonia,” by Raivo Vetik. 
This article examines the attitudes both ordinary citizens have of the European Union and 
the attitudes found amongst Estonia’s political elite. Unfortunately, this article was 
composed in 2003, right before the country acceded into the EU. Therefore, its findings 
that Estonians were some of the most Eurosceptic people entering into the European Union 
does not remain valid in present day.92 However, this does represent somewhat of a lack in 
the literature that this thesis aims to fill in.   
The second article that examines Euroscepticism and Estonia is, “Discursive 
Opportunities for the Estonian Populist Radical Right in Digital Society,” by Andres 
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Kasekamp, et. al. Here, the authors discuss how the radical right in Estonia utilize social 
media and other new forms of media in order to propagate their message. It is also one of 
the articles and pieces of literature that goes into relative depth about the EKRE party and 
its stances. The authors go into detail regarding how the party spreads its ideas, including 
its anti-Russian and anti-immigrant stances.9394 It concludes that EKRE relies heavily on 
alternative media and uses it to espouse its ideals. It also states that its messages are able to 
reach a wide audience by using anti-establishment and populist rhetoric.95 While this 
article is new, relevant, and focuses on EKRE, it does not interview party members or 
heads directly.  
The third article that examines the phenomenon of Euroscepticism in Estonia is 
entitled, “Russians, Refugees and Europeans: What Shapes the Discourse of the 
Conservative People’s Party of Estonia,” by Louis Wierenga. In this article, the author 
looks at the rise of EKRE and the rhetoric that surrounds it. The author of this text brings 
up many of the same points that this thesis brings forward. Additionally, Wierenga utilizes 
interviews to obtain many of his information. For instance, Wierenga writes that in an 
interview with Jaak Madison, the interviewee remarked how, “the EU is one of the most 
undemocratic systems, citing penalties for not accepting EU mandates and rules.”96 This is 
a very similar sentiment that was expressed by the same individual in an interview for this 
thesis. However, there are some key differences between the text crafted by Wierenga and 
this thesis. One of the most prominent differences is that Wierenga does not use the 
Sussex-school of party-based Euroscepticism to analyze EKRE. Instead, he utilizes the 
populist radical right criteria in order to define and illustrate the position of the party.97 
Another key difference between the article and this thesis is the overall focus. In the 
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writing by Wierenga, the main conclusion that is drawn is in how EKRE views the large 
Russian minority that is present in the country. He writes that: 
 
“The conclusion is reached that EKRE is an Estonian nationalist party and 
would accept Russian-speakers as members provided that they speak 
Estonian and present themselves as Estonian nationalists. The party would 
accept this type of Estonian nationalist, with a Russian background, but will 
not change their campaign literature to the Russian language.”98 
This illustrates that the main focus of the paper is on how the party views the Russian 
minority in the country. However, it also illuminates another key fact about EKRE. That is 
the pragmatism of the party. This willingness to work with the Russian population shows 
that the party is willing and able to cooperate with certain groups and entities in order to 
further its overall agenda.  
 The fourth article that examines the rise of EKRE in Estonia is entitled, “The ‘New’ 
Wave of Populist Right-Wing Parties in Central and Eastern Europe: Explaining electoral 
Support for the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia,” by Siim Trumm. As the title 
suggests, this article examines how and why this particular party has been able to gain such 
monumental support. The main conclusion that is drawn from the research is that, “anti-
immigration sentiment was not the key driver for EKRE support at the 2015 parliamentary 
election, voters’ self-perceived identity was important in understanding who voted for the 
party.”99 This article, therefore, presents a foil to the main claim made by this thesis. This 
will be discussed more later in the analysis chapter. 
These various articles on Estonia and Euroscepticism highlight two main ways in 
which the current literature is lacking. The first is that there is a lack of articles that directly 
interact with EKRE politicians via interviews. While Wiengra utilizes interviews with key 
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party figures, his paper does not examine the level of Euroscepticism of EKRE using the 
Sussex school of party-based Euroscepticism. Instead, he uses the categorization method 
developed by Vasilopoulou. This is the void that this thesis hopes to fill-in. By conducting 
direct interviews with party members, a new way of examining the EKRE will be brought 
to the forefront of the analysis of the group. Secondly, none of the articles discussed 
analyze the party using the Sussex School of party-based Euroscepticism. Since this is the 
backbone of this paper, a further aspect of viewing this party and analyzing its position.  
Populist Literature: 
 While the goal of this paper is to examine the Eurosceptic policies and beliefs of 
EKRE, the various pieces of literature devoted to populism are also very useful. This is 
attributable to the fact that EKRE is a populist radical right party. For parties that fall into 
this category, Eurosceptic rhetoric plays a large role in its attempts to gain votes. This is 
exemplified in the article, “The Populist Radical Right and European Integration: A 
Comparative Analysis of Party–Voter Links,” by Margarita Gomez-Reino and Ivan 
Llamazares. This article helps establish a link between populist radical right parties and 
Euroscepticism. In their research, the authors find that, “all populist radical right parties are 
more Eurosceptic than the weighted national party system average, and all populist radical 
right party voters but two hold more Eurosceptic orientations than their respective national 
averages.”100 While EKRE is not mentioned in their analysis, this statement helps to 
illustrate that, as a populist party, EKRE would be more likely to use Euroscepticism as a 
rhetorical device. This article also shows that this Eurosceptic attitude is able to connect to 
the party’s voters and that supply-side factors are the most important factor for a populist 
party’s success.101102 
Consequently, it is vital to analyze the theories and definitions that are central to the 
idea of populism. There are two authors that best discuss and define the concept of 
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Euroscepticism. Those two individuals are Benjamin Moffit and Cas Mudde. The two 
books that deserve special attention are “The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, 
Political Style, and Representation,” by Benjamin Moffit and “On Extremism and 
Democracy in Europe,” by Cas Mudde. These two books help further contextualize the rise 
of EKRE and its tactics. 
 The first book that should be mentioned is “The Global Rise of Populism,” by 
Benjamin Moffit. This book provides one of the best and clearest definitions of populism. 
Moffit states that previous definitions of populism have proved to be too broad and or too 
vague. For instance, Moffit states that Ionescu’s and Gellner’s definition of the concept is 
“rather frustrating, with the results veering from unwieldy lists of the descriptive features 
of populism…to attempts to delineate the structural conditions of the emergence of 
populism...”103 The author dissects other notable definitions, finding them all 
unsatisfactory. Writing that populism is neither an ideology, strategy, discourse, or political 
logic, Moffit states that, “contemporary populism is a political style that is used by a wide 
range of actors across the world.”104 He goes on to further state that populism is comprised 
of three key features: “appeal to the people versus the elite; bad manners; and a crisis 
breakdown or threat.”105It is Moffit’s conceptualization that will serve as the definition of 
populism in this thesis. 
 This text is crucial to understanding what populism is because it is able to explain 
how various different populist leaders, who come from varying parties on the political 
spectrum, can be defined as populist. By playing and performing certain roles, certain 
actors are able to appeal to a wide variety of people within a society. Additionally, Moffit 
comes to the conclusion that populism is harmful to democracy in the long run (though it 
can provide some benefits).106  
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 Another key text that deals with populism is “On Extremism and Democracy in 
Europe,” by Cas Mudde.” In this book, the author makes the claim that populism is not a 
pathology of democracy, but rather as a “pathological normalcy”107 This term implies that 
populism is not a concept that can be eliminated within democracy. Instead, it will always 
be a part of it. The populist radical right parties that have been emerging over the years can 
be attributable to “resentment around immigration, crime, and party politics…”108 This is 
important because it goes against the idea that it is economics that provide the main 
catalyst for successful radical right-wing parties. However, Mudde is determined to make it 
clear that populist radical right parties are not responsible for many of the right-leaning 
tendencies in Europe that have emerged in the past few years. For instance, he makes it 
clear that these parties were not responsible for the Eurosceptic turn of Europeans nor were 
they the catalyst behind the more authoritarian politics that have dominated the 21st 
century.109 Rather, Mudde states that “it has been the mainstream right-wing that has 
pushed West European politics to the right, in part in response to media and popular 
responses to relatively recent developments.”110  
 In addition to populism, Mudde also devotes a section of his book to the idea of 
Euroscepticism. Mudde uses a portion of this chapter (as well as throughout his book) to 
lament against the political elite of Europe. He believes that they have, by and large, 
opened the door to allow populist parties to gain a foothold in mainstream politics. 
Additionally, he accuses these elites of fearmongering when discussing far right and 
Eurosceptic parties. For instance, he cites Jean Claude Junker when he stated, “I am chilled 
by the realization of how similar circumstances in Europe in 2013 are to those of 100 years 
ago.”111 Mudde cites various statistics that illustrate the small percentage of rightwing 
party gains during the 2014 European elections. He writes, of the 2014 elections, “this 
reflects the ongoing trend of fractionalization in national party systems, in which big 
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parties are shrinking…the number of represented parties is growing.”112 This quotation 
supports Mudde’s claim that European parties are merely changing and are not necessarily 
drifting rightwards. 
 These two books are both important when discussing Euroscepticism and the 
EKRE party in Estonia. Mudde and Moffit both provide context for how the party has been 
able to gain in popularity over the years. Moffit’s definition of Euroscepticism as a 
performance helps explain the tactics that EKRE utilizes in order to appeal to various 
individuals. Also, by removing the idea that populism is an ideology or strategy, he is able 
to showcase how this party is able to utilize at times strategies that may appear to be 
contradictory. Additionally, Mudde’s text is invaluable because it bucks the trend that both 
populism and Euroscepticism are new phenomena to Europe brought about by economic 
reasons. 
 However, there are various points of contention within these two texts, especially 
with Mudde’s. The first detail that is missing from these texts is that neither discusses the 
country of Estonia. This illustrates that there is a lack in the literature regarding this 
country and its growing populist radical right party. Another problem with this book is that 
a lot has changed since it was first published.  For instance, Mudde states in one of the 
earlier chapters that rise of Eurosceptic populist parties “were [greatest] in Southern and 
Western Europe, while Eastern Europe was remarkably stable on average.”113 This is no 
longer the case as Eastern Europe has seen its own rise in Eurosceptic parties. This not 
only includes EKRE, but also PiS in Poland. Another weakness of Mudde’s book is that it 
focuses almost solely on Western Europe. This is understandable as the states west of the 
new member states saw the greatest increase in far-right parties in the 2014 EP elections. 
However, this is no longer the case and requires an update.  
 While Moffit’s text does not have any inherent flaws, throughout the book, there is 
not a single chapter devoted to a case study. This is not necessary to his argument, as he 
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believes that most of the works done on populism are focused on Europe, Latin America, 
and North America.114 However, this provides another path in which this thesis can 
contribute to existing literature. By examining a Eurosceptic, populist party that has 
emerged in a stable and prospering country like Estonia, this thesis can illustrate how 
Moffit’s definition is applicable to countries outside of Western Europe.  
 In addition to these full-length books, there are other articles and shorter-length 
pieces of literature that address populism in a way that relates to this thesis. The first is 
titled, “Balancing Between Solidarity and Responsibility: Estonia in the EU Refugee 
Crisis,” by Viljar Veebel. This article examines why Estonia adopted a relatively 
conservative policy regarding the migrant crisis that plagued the EU in the mid-2010s. The 
authors argue that the roots of the policy can be traced to numerous factors, including fears 
of the country becoming a transit country during the early post-Soviet years, to the fact that 
the state does not have the financial means to cope with new arrivals. However, the main 
point made by the authors is that, “Recent public opinion surveys in Estonia clearly 
indicate strong opposition both to the growing influx of refugees in Europe in general and 
to the decisions taken by the government of Estonia with regard to country’s obligations in 
particular.”115 This is a crucial point because it points to a possible root as to why the 
EKRE political party is able to gain a foothold in Estonia. Additionally, it helps refute the 
idea that financial reasons are behind Eurosceptic parties rising in popularity. 
Conclusion: 
This literature review has worked to paint a picture of the current theories and 
analysis of party-based Euroscepticism. It has also worked to illustrate the gaps in the 
literature that this thesis hopes to fill in. The major way in which this paper will contribute 
to the existing literature is that it will present the case of a country that is not widely 
addressed in party-based Eurosceptic literature. Additionally, much of the literature on 
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party-based Euroscepticism focuses on parties that are already in power. Very little is 
devoted to examining parties that are aiming to either gain power or increase their 
notoriety. 
It was also critical to fully define the concept of Euroscepticism. Specifically, this 
chapter was used to fully flesh out the concept of party-based Euroscepticism. The subjects 
of this analysis were Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak who support the Sussex School of 
party-based Euroscepticism, Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde who devised their own form of 
party-based Euroscepticism, Sofia Vasilopoulou who attempted to repair the flaws in the 
latter two theories, and Leonard Ray who devised the North Carolina School of party-based 
Euroscepticism. While both definitions are well defined and thought-out, the Sussex form 
of researching Euroscepticism proved to be the best fit for this thesis.  
This literature review has also served to justify why the Sussex School of party-
based Euroscepticism was chosen as the primary methodology for this paper. Due to the 
scope and the dataset that will be used, it makes more sense to utilize the technique 
developed by Taggart and Szczerbiak. Also, these two authors have done more to define 
and address the potential weaknesses associated with their categorization of Eurosceptic 
parties.  
The concept of populism is also undeniably associated with Euroscepticism. As 
previously stated, while this paper is not devoted to the topic of populism, it is an 
important concept that must be addressed. Benjamin Moffit provides one of the clearest 
and concise definitions of populism. By describing it as a political performance rather than 
trying to define it as an ideology and or strategy Moffit brings a whole new perspective to 
this concept. This helps explain why populism is a phenomenon that is visible throughout 
the political spectrum. Additionally, the work done by Cas Mudde is also invaluable. Being 
able to illustrate the populism is a normal aspect of democracy, Mudde highlights a key 
aspect of populism that often goes unnoticed by other academics.  
The central argument of this thesis is as follows: EKRE is a populist radical right 
party that takes a hard-Eurosceptic view of the EU. The party positions itself as the 
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protector of the Estonian nation. This nativism then motivates and shapes the Eurosceptic 
policies and ideas of EKRE. The party is hostile towards the European Union because, 
from its perspective, the union forces Estonia to submit to policies that are inherently 
detrimental to the survival of the nation state. Therefore, economics do not have any 
influence on the rise of this particular far-right party in this particular country. The idea of 
globalization leading to vast numbers of alienated and economically downtrodden citizens 
to gravitate towards a Eurosceptic party is false. Rather, it is the fear of losing the unique 
culture that is synonymous with Estonia. This fear arises from an increasingly integrated 
European Union that appears to threaten the sovreignity and homogeneity of the country. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Introduction  
 As previously explained, this paper will gather the appropriate data by collecting 
interviews from different members of the Estonian EKRE party. The goal of this 
methodology is to answer two questions. The first question is, what kind of Eurosceptic 
party is EKRE? The methodology used in this thesis will help illustrate that according to 
this school of thought, EKRE is a hard-Eurosceptic party as defined by Taggart and 
Szczerbiak. The second main research question is, does nativism fuel this hard-Eurosceptic 
view? That method is in-depth interviews with high ranking EKRE party members. 
Overall, two EKRE MPs were interviewed. The first was party vice-chairman Jaak 
Madison. The second interview was with party leader Martin Helme. The method of 
analysis for these interviews was coding. Finally, this section of the paper will work to 
assess the success and the drawbacks of this methodology.  
The chapter will be divided into four sections. The first section will serve to justify 
and contextualize why this specific form of methodology was chosen for this thesis. The 
next section will provide information on the actual methodology used by this thesis. The 
third section will describe the method of analysis used to examine the data gathered from 
these interviews. The final section will examine how successful the use of interview 
questions was in the gathering of information. This chapter will conclude with a brief 
conclusion that will summarize the previous points made. 
Why Interviews and a Single Case Study: 
 Interviews were chosen for this paper for a variety of reasons. The first main reason 
is that by using the Sussex School of party-based Euroscepticism with interviews, a new 
source of data collection for the theory is provided. As previously stated in the preceding 
chapter, Sussesx-based analysis of European parties relies heavily on the use of discourse 
analysis. This analysis relies heavily on party pamphlets and pieces of party literature. 
However, in their two volumes of “Opposing Europe,” neither Taggart nor Szczerbiak 
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discuss the use of direct interviews with party members as a way of gauging how 
Eurosceptic a party is. Therefore, the use of interviews can be seen as a new way in which 
to gather qualitative date for analysis.  
 Another reason why interviews were utilized for this thesis was due to the fact that 
interviews can help eliminate the possible unreliable results of only interpreting party 
literature. By conducting face-to-face interviews, the data gathered was directly from those 
who craft and shape the policies of the party. Additionally, the interviewer is able to ask 
directly where on the political spectrum the party in question lies. This helps eliminate part 
of the ambiguity that can possibly arise when utilizing party-based Euroscepticism.  
The Methodology Used: 
 Four categories of questions were developed for these interviews. The first set of 
questions attempt to grasp how Eurosceptic EKRE is. This was accomplished by asking 
how the party views the European Union, what future policies the party would push for in 
the European Parliament and what other parties they would cooperate with, how individual 
party members would classify their party, and their views on an EU army. The two 
questions that are directly related to the European Union are: is there a democratic deficit 
and is it an elite driven organization. There are both relatively straightforward in what they 
are trying to ascertain. These two questions are attempting to see if the party and its 
members are opposed to the EU on “where there is a principled opposition” (hard 
Eurosceptic) or if there are, “concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the 
expression of qualified opposition to the EU (soft Eurosceptic).”  
The questions related to the parliaments is once again trying to ascertain if the potential 
policies that EKRE would propose are harmful or beneficial to the European Union and its 
future integration efforts. Additionally, this question served to see which parties EKRE 
feels comfortable cooperating with and if they are hard-Eurosceptic parties. Finally, the 
most straightforward question, where would you position the party on the political 
spectrum, simply is trying to have the members state they feel about the party 
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The second set of questions, as stated before, was created in order to determine what 
attitudes or beliefs the party possess in regards to the society as a whole. The first question 
to do this relates to the idea of what it means to be Estonian and how the party wants to 
preserve this unique culture. Of course, there is nothing exclusively right-wing about this, 
however, as will be discussed in the results and analysis chapters, this question wanted to 
see if there were certain phrases utilized by these party members that appeal to certain 
right-wing sensibilities. The second question, relating to the Russian and Muslim 
minorities in the country followed a similar goal as the previous question. This question 
wanted to see how the party members viewed the minorities of the country and their 
relation to the Estonians. The interviewer wanted to see if the EKRE parliamentarians 
viewed potential refugees from North Africa and the Middle East in a different light 
compared to the large Russian minority in the country. The final question, dealing with 
what the perceived biggest threat to Estonia is, is one of the main aspects of the thesis. This 
question is designed to see if economics is ever mentioned as the biggest threat. If the main 
threat towards the country, and therefore primary focus of the party, is not economics, then 
it is logical to assume that the party is more focused on more nativist concerns. 
The third category focuses on the policy aspects of the party. These questions all serve 
a different purpose. The question related to how EKRE plans on bringing in new people is 
asked because the interviewer wanted to see how the party planned to move into the future. 
Would it soften its tone, would it become more hardline, etc. The question regarding the 
Blue Awakening organization is also related to how the party plans to move forward in the 
future. The researcher wished to see how the organization planned to conduct its 
relationship with the youth organization. This question was posed because the researcher 
wanted to see how the party planned on replenishing its ranks in the future. Specifically, if 
EKRE planned on using the group to further spread its populist and nativist ideas.  
The other question of this section regarded the issue of direct democracy. The purpose 
of this question was to unearth two ideas. The first has to do with populism. Direct 
democracy is typically associated with populist governments as it is a policy that claims to 
give power to the people. Another reason this question was asked is that it can expose how 
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a party views minorities. Since direct democracies are geared towards satisfying the 
majority, they can potentially ignore the minority populations. That is why the question, 
“are there any drawbacks,” was added. The final two questions of this category addressed 
EKRE and the national parliament. These questions addressed potential policies that EKRE 
would enact if in a coalition government and any potential coalition partners. These were 
asked to gauge what potential Eurosceptic or populist measures the party wished to 
implement if in power. 
The final category of questions that were posed to the interviewees did not directly 
address whether the party was hard-Eurosceptic or what type of rhetoric they used. Instead, 
these were more miscellaneous questions that were either background questions or were 
believed to illicit possibly useful of interesting answers for this thesis. For instance, 
questions in this category included, “what attracted you to politics,” or “why did you want 
to join EKRE.” Questions such as these were useful in that they provided context for the 
various answers that these interview subjects provided.    
Method of Analysis 
 In order to extract information from the interviews themselves, the process of 
coding was used. The coding was done manually since there was a relatively small number 
of interviews. This meant that the researcher could simply examine the transcribed texts 
and manually match certain key words and terms to the categories that were created for this 
research. There are three categories for the various codes developed. The first category of 
codes is based on Euroscepticism. The second category focuses on nativism. The third and 
final code dealt with populism.  
 The first set of codes, dealing with the Euroscepticism, are simply, “hard 
Eurosceptic” and “soft Eurosceptic.” These codes are based on how Taggart and 
Szczerbiak conceptualize the idea of hard and soft-Euroscepticism. Therefore, hard 
Eurosceptic phrases are those that, “where there is a principled opposition to the EU and 
European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries 
should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to 
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being opposed to the whole project of European integration.”116 Meanwhile soft 
Eurosceptic statements are those where, “there is a not a principled objection to European 
integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas 
lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU.”117  
 The second set of codes, dealing with nativism, are as follows. The first code is 
“tradition.” This code is used to categorize the terms and phrased used by the participants 
that invoke an ideal set of qualities that are unique to the Estonian nation. This would also 
include any mention of family values or the importance of family to the nation. The idea of 
going back to the past is also a term that would fall under this code.  For instance, this can 
refer to phrases or claims that emphasize religious ideals or glorify a country’s past. 
 The second code that is a member of this category is “demographics.” This code 
refers to the statements made by the interviewees that have to deal with the population and 
the make-up of the population residing in the country. If an interviewee discussed how 
Estonian children needed to be born, this would also be coded as demographics. More 
often than not, the phrases that fall under this code refer to the threat of ethnic Estonians 
becoming marginalized in the country.  
 The third code for this category is “sovreignity.” This code is used to describe 
statements that were made that are dedicated to maintaining the independence of the 
Republic of Estonia. Typically, comments that were made related to this code often 
referred to the idea that Estonia needed to maintain its ability to control its borders and that 
it had to refute any EU principles that supposedly infringed upon Estonia’s independence 
(such as the Schengen zone and supranational laws). 
 The final primary code that was used during the analysis was “populism.” This 
code encompassed phrases from the interview that were deemed to be populistic. In order 
to gauge which phrases met these criteria, the definition provided by Benjamin Moffit was 
                                                          
116 Taggart and Szczerbiak, Opposing Europe vol.I. Location 181 
117 Ibid 192 
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utilized. As stated in the literature review, as a political style populism is a political style 
that attempts to, “appeal to the people versus the elite; bad manners; and a crisis 
breakdown or threat.”118 Therefore, statements that were deemed to be appealing to the 
masses and or critical of any perceived elite was deemed to comply with this definition. 
These statements will then be compared to party literature, statements, and acts in order to 
establish that EKRE is engaging in a political style. The following chart can help provide 
the reader with examples of the types of sentences that corresponded with specific codes. 
 Additionally, when examining populism, statements and phrases used by EKRE 
party members in public interviews and statements were utilized. As this thesis uses 
Benjamin Moffit’s conceptualization of populism, a party’s political style must be 
analyzed. It would not be enough to present only information gathered from one-on-one 
interviews. It is also necessary to examine what the various politicians say and how they 
act in public. The following chart will help provide examples as to what phrases will be 
associated with certain codes and sub-codes. 
CODE SUB-CODE PHRASE 
Hard-Euroscepticism EU as anti-democratic Well I think the 
antidemocratic nature of the 
EU is not a bug it’s a feature 
it’s the way the system was 
designed I find it absolutely 
repugnant that we have some 
8000 directives and some 
6000 what’s the other thing 
they do…directives are the 
ones that you can change a bit 
and the other ones come 
direct…anyways we have well 
                                                          
118 Moffit, The Global Rise of Populism. pg.25 
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of a ¼ of a million pages of 
legislation in EE and absolute 
majority of them are EU 
Soft-Euroscepticism Current EU trajectory  I think that the very risky way 
the EU is going now is getting 
larger and getting new 
member states especially from 
the western Balkan 
Appeal to Tradition Lutherianism and that that’s all part of our 
and the heritage and generally 
the Lutherian work ethics 
which I have to say regretfully 
together the decline of 
lutherianism is declining as 
well 
Concerns over sovreignity  Border control And the second one is control 
of borders. Immigration needs 
to be under EE control you 
can only do that when you 
control your borders. Which is 
to say that also within EU we 
would have to start checking 
documents on harbors and 
airport and keeping the 
immigration to an absolute 
minimum. 
Concerns over demographics Small immigration but as small immigration as 
possible the numbers should 
be really tiny which they are 
not right now 
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Populist Deep state We learned that it would have 
been vulnerable to outside 
manipulations sort of the 
deepstate it would have been 
corrupted by the deep state 
Success of the interview method 
 This subchapter serves to examine how successful the technique of interviews was. 
Overall, it can be said that this technique was successful and worthwhile. The interviewees 
were very open and provided in-depth answers to all of the questions. Additionally, the use 
of interviews allowed the researcher to gain incredibly valuable insights about the party 
and its views on the current events both in the country, and in Europe as a whole. However, 
despite the overall success of the methodology used, there are still some potential 
drawbacks that will be discussed and examined.  
 The first, and most obvious problem, is that the interviews were conducted in a 
language that was not the subjects’ primary language. Due to the fact that the interviewer 
was not a native Estonian speaker, it was necessary to conduct these interviews in English. 
The main problem with this technique is that there is a risk of miscommunication or the 
interviewee potentially using a word in English that either does not properly translate into 
Estonian or otherwise misusing an English word. Another potential tactic would have been 
to utilize a translator in order to allow the subjects to speak in their native language and 
potentially avoid any miscommunications. However, this would have presented its own 
(graver) drawbacks. The main drawback is that there would be a filter between the 
interviewer and their subject. Even if the translator was highly skilled and recommended, 
there would still be elements of interpretation throughout the translation. Therefore, it is 
better to have the subject directly (even if imperfectly) speak to the interviewer rather than 
have their message be reconstructed by a third party. Additionally, both of the interview 
subjects speak English at a proficient level. 
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 A third potential criticism that can be levelled against this paper is that interviews 
were only conducted with a small number of MPs of the EKRE party, and not with a larger 
amount of EKRE MPs or with other parliamentarians that are members of different parties. 
The accusation could be made that by only interviewing members of one political party, 
the insights of the paper may be more aligned with their beliefs rather than providing an 
objective review of the party. However, there are two main issues with this critique. The 
first major issue is that interviewing members of parliament would have only been possible 
if all parties that currently have seat in parliament could have provided individuals to be 
interviewed. This would mean that not only EKRE but also the five other parties would 
have to have been interviewed. This would have increased the scope of the paper beyond 
reason. Also, as this methodology uses the Sussex school of party-based Euroscepticism, 
the thesis only concerned with the language and opinions of EKRE and its leading 
members. 
 The second rebuttal to this potential critique is that, as a populist radical right party, 
EKRE would have a very hierarchical party structure. As Karl Magnus Johansson states, 
“When it comes to CEE, many of the newly created parties, like populist ones, tended to 
emerge in a top-down manner (van Biezen and Mair 2006: 105), and to remain 
centralized.”119 Therefore, if the majority of the decisions regarding party will be 
concentrated at the top echelons of the party. That is why so few interviews were 
conducted. Because these interviews were conducted with high level members, the 
researcher was able to ascertain the attitudes of the party and its policies without having to 
interview large numbers of party members.   
Despite the myriad of potential criticisms that can be directed towards the use of 
interviews in this thesis, the overall process should be hailed as a success. Each interview 
yielded a large amount of useful and useable data was gathered. These interviews allowed 
the researcher to analyze the speech of the interview subjects. The interviews were highly 
informative and those interviewed gave long, in-depth answers to the various questions 
                                                          
119 Karl Magnus Johansson, ‘How Populist Parties Organize,’ PESO Research Report no.2 (2014) 1-46 
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asked. None of those interviewed appeared to hold back any information or try and dodge a 
question. However, it is crucial to remember that the interview subjects can withhold 
certain pieces of information or moderate their views.  
Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter is to both explain how the methodology used answers the 
research questions asked and to give an in-depth description of said methodology. In order 
to gather the data necessary to answer these questions, interviews were carried out with 
high ranking members of the political party. The codes that were used to analyze these 
interviews can be divided into three categories: themes of nativism, populism, 
Euroscepticism, and more miscellaneous questions that provide both background 
information and ask questions that are indirectly related to the research questions. While 
the use of interviews does illicit some potential problems, this chapter worked to illustrate 
that these problems were either minor or were not harmful to the results of the thesis. 
In order to analyze the data gathered, qualitative content analysis was used to 
dissect the answers that were given by the interview subjects. As stated, this method of 
analysis was chosen because it allowed the interviewer to further dissect the answers 
provided by the subjects. The codes that were crafted for this thesis were designed to 
answer the two main research questions described earlier in the paper.  
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Chapter 4: RESULTS 
Introduction:  
The results of the interviews will be divided by the code categories. Therefore, the 
subchapters will be: Euroscepticism in the interviews; nativism in the interviews; and 
populism in the interviews. The methodology chapter stated that in order to more 
effectively examine the interviews, coding was utilized, and specific phrases and 
quotations were examined and categorized. Overall, six major codes were utilized for this 
thesis (hard-Euoscepticism, soft-Euroscepticism, tradition, demographics, sovreignity, and 
populism). Additionally, each of these codes, all had their own sub-codes. The overall 
results of the codes are as follows: the mention of hard Eurosceptic terms numbered thirty-
two times; soft Eurosceptic rhetoric was used ten times; policies and views steeped in 
tradition was used eleven times; demographics was used twenty-two times; the issue of 
sovreignity was brought up a total of eight times; and finally populist rhetoric was 
espoused sixteen times. Terms that were more miscellaneous were mentioned a total 
twenty-eight times.  
This chapter will only have three subchapters. Each subchapter will coincide with a 
specific theme from the interview. Each section will illustrate what codes were used in the 
answers and the number of times certain codes were mentioned. The deeper analysis and 
the connection of these interviews to certain themes will be explored more in the following 
chapter. 
Euroscepticism in the interviews: 
 Throughout the interviews, the interview subjects expressed reservations about the 
power of the EU. The coding of this section finds that the party members interviewed are 
far more likely to utilize hard Eurosceptic rhetoric. Additionally, during these 
conversations, the party very rarely, if ever, discussed economic reasons for its Eurosceptic 
positions. 
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 In the first interview with party vice chairman Jaak Madison, sub-codes for hard 
Eurosceptic phrasing was used a total of sixteen times, while soft Eurosceptic phrasing was 
only used a total of four times. Similarly, in the interview with party vice president Martin 
Helme, hard Eurosceptic rhetoric was used a total of sixteen times while soft Eurosceptic 
phrases were only utilized six times.  
Nativism in interviews: 
 The second theme of the interview was to illicit from the interviewees the forms of 
nativist rhetoric and phrasing the party uses to fuel its Euroscepticism. In the interviews 
one of the main goals was to see if economic or more nativist factors that caused 
individuals to vote for this party. The codes from this category help support this idea, as 
various phrases were exclaimed during the interviews that pointed to the idea that socio-
cultural fears were behind the rise of this party, rather than economics. However, like the 
previous section, the respondents also discussed Eurosceptic topics in these questions. 
 For the questions regarding nativism, there were a total of three codes that were 
devised in order to ascertain the rhetoric that motivated the policies advocated by EKRE. 
The results of the first interview with Jaak Madison will be examined first. During this 
interview, nativist codes were mentioned a total of fifteen times. From there, the tradition 
code was discussed five times; the demographics code appeared nine times; and the 
sovreignity code was discussed once.  
 When examining Martin Helme’s interview, it is critical to note that his interview 
was notably longer than the one with Jaak Madison. The interview with Helme ran almost 
fifty-nine minutes while the interview with Madison ran at a hair under forty-five minutes. 
This should be kept in mind when looking at the numerical differences in the amount of 
codes used in each conversation. That being said, the total number of times that phrases 
related to tradition were used numbered six times. For demographics, the number of code-
able phrases numbered thirteen. Finally, sovreignity, and topics related to this, was 
mentioned seven times.  
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Populism: 
 The final main code of this thesis was the code of populism. Although this code 
does not directly relate to the ideas of Euroscepticism, this is a concept that is a major 
aspect to this thesis. As previously stated, populism is coded as statements that were 
deemed to be appealing to the masses and or critical of any perceived elite. Statements that 
fit these criteria permeated throughout the interview and can be found in multiple areas. 
The is especially true in the interview with Martin Helme. Overall, the number of populist 
statements made by Jaak Madison in his interview was only two times. On the other hand, 
the number of these forms of statements in the Martin Helme interview numbered fourteen. 
As will become apparent in the analysis of these interviews, these results are not surprising, 
as Martin Helme was noticeably less moderate than Mr. Madison in his interview.  
Discussion of the results 
 Before analyzing the results in the next chapter, a discussion of the outcomes of 
these interviews is necessary. First, the Eurosceptic codes will be examined. What becomes 
immediately apparent is that terms that are deemed hard-Eurosceptic vastly outnumber 
those that can be viewed as soft-Eurosceptic. This indicates that the party members that 
volunteered for these discussions were far more comfortable using remarks that indicated a 
staunch opposition to European integration and the European project.  
 The second set of codes, involving nativist issues, also gave the researcher various 
interesting points of data to analyze. In the “tradition” code, there were various key sub-
codes that emerged. For instance, codes such as, “connection (to an identity),” “fear of the 
other,” and “unique (referring to Estonian qualities)” were all prevalent when examining 
sub-codes that fit under the umbrella code of tradition. Additionally, the code of 
“sovreignity” also produced various prominent sub-codes. Two sub-codes that emerged 
from the interviews were “border protection” and “nation state (in referring to its 
necessity).” Many times, these sub-codes emerged when the interview subjects were 
voicing opposition against the EU and its supposed attempts to swallow up the small 
Estonian state.  
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 Another major trait of this interview is the issue of demographics. In both of these 
interviews, the code for demographics appeared more than any other nativist code. Both 
Jaak Madison and Martin Helme relied heavily on this code, as their mention of 
demographic issues far outnumbered the other codes that fell under the same category. This 
indicates that the issue of what ethnicity dominates the country is arguably the biggest 
concern for these top party members. While this will be more flushed out in the next 
chapter, this points to the idea that for the top party members in the party, there is a 
fundamental need to preserve the dominance of the Estonian ethnicity within the country. 
 The third key takeaway from this chapter is how much more vocal Martin Helme 
was in comparison to Jaak Madison. While his exact rhetoric will be analyzed in the next 
segment, the sheer number of codes that his speech covered noticeably outnumbered the 
number of codes mentioned by Madison. This hints at the heterogeneity of the party, at 
least at the top of the party leadership. Helme even alludes to this in his interview when he 
stated that his high degree of Euroscepticism is not necessarily mimicked by other party 
members. This heterogeneity is also evident from the different issues that were emphasized 
by the two politicians. While both individuals voiced their concerns over demographics, 
Helme’s interview contained far more populist terms and phrases than Madison’s.  
 However, while Jaak Madison did not use populist rhetoric nearly as often as 
Martin Helme, the fact that both used phrases that can be seen as populist help reinforce 
the claims made earlier in the thesis. Namely, that this party, is a populist radical right 
party and its Eurosceptic rhetoric is fueled by nativism. By constantly voicing disapproval 
against the elite, EKRE is able to position itself as the voice of and defender of the 
common citizen. The answers that these men gave regarding the issue of direct democracy 
(as will be discussed next chapter) help support this.  
 There was one final set of codes. While these were not officially part of the three 
main categories of codes that were examined (Euroscepticism, socio-cultural rhetoric, or 
populism), they still shed light on the mindset and the policies advocated by these men. 
While these “miscellaneous” terms were present throughout the interview, they mostly 
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emerged in the early sections of the interviews. It was here that the interview subjects often 
spoke of what attracted them to the party and to politics in general. Here, codes such as, 
“early exposure (to nationalist rhetoric)” and “opportunity to advance (within the party)” 
emerge to help give context to the beliefs of these individuals. Additionally, there were 
many remarks regarding the surprising success of the party and how it “shocked” the 
political establishment.    
Conclusion 
 This chapter has taken the interviews that were conducted and illustrated how the 
various codes were devised and applied to said interviews. Both interviews contained 
phrases and statements that were hard-Eurosceptic in nature and these statements far 
outnumbered the ones that could be deemed soft-Eurosceptic. Additionally, both interviews 
were flush with instances of the volunteers using terms terminology that discussed fears 
grounded cultural fears about the future of the country. The interviews were also abundant 
of instances of populist rhetoric designed to appeal to the people while railing against the 
supposed status-quo. The results that have been discussed here have helped lay the 
foundation for the analyses that will be examined in the next chapter. It is not enough to 
simply state that this is a hard-Eurosceptic party just because the rhetoric used in the 
interviews was largely based on that concept. The various quotations still need to be 
analyzed in order to ascertain why they are hard-Eurosceptic or why they indicate that 
cultural issues are more important than economic issues.   
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Chapter 5: Analysis of Results 
Introduction 
 Throughout this thesis, the statement has been made that EKRE is a populist radical 
right party that is, by nature, also hard-Eurosceptic. Additionally, its hard-Eurosceptic 
nature is fueled by nativism. It is not economic down-turns that drive this rhetoric, but 
rather the idea that Estonia is a nation under threat from the supranational entity that is the 
EU and “foreign” cultures and people from far-away lands. It is now time to finally prove 
this assertion. In order to accomplish this goal, the results from the previous chapter will be 
examined through the lens of the authors mentioned in the preceding literature review, as 
well as a handful of others. The main focus of the analysis will be on the language that was 
used by the interviewees. 
 There will be two ways in which this analysis is carried out. The first method will 
be an examination of direct quotations from the interviews. This technique will directly 
analyze the language employed by the interview subjects in order to see how said language 
fits into the analysis of Euroscepticism provided by other authors and analysts. The second 
way in which the information will be analyzed is through the various codes that are found 
within the various interviews. This method examines the information in a slightly more 
indirect manner. While the interviewees might not directly mention a certain topic, the 
language employed by them might certainly hint or strongly suggest a certain theme.   
 This chapter’s subsections will be divided according to the major code categories. 
Therefore, the first sub-section will analyze the miscellaneous codes; the second sub-
chapter is dedicated to the parts of the interviews that examine the position of the party on 
the Eurosceptic spectrum; the third sub-chapter will analyze the quotations and phrases 
related to the party’s rhetoric; the fourth section will deal with the populist language of the 
interviews. This chapter will end with a brief conclusion that will summarize the findings. 
Analysis of Miscellaneous Codes  
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 The background questions of the various interviews were geared more towards 
easing the interview subjects into the interview and establishing a report between the 
interviewee and the researcher. However, this does not mean that the answers provided in 
these questions should be ignored. In fact, there are notable instances where the answers 
provided in this section helped provide context as to why these politicians possess their 
specific world views and promote certain policies. 
 Martin Helme provides the most obvious example of his background laying the 
foundation for his current world view. In his interview, he stated that, “my family…were 
all very anti-communist and what it was and what it had done to our relatives what mass 
killings and occupation I knew it since I was a child so I was a well-informed 
youngster.”120 This provides perhaps the clearest instance of how an individual’s 
upbringing influences how they perceive the world around them. Throughout the 
conversation with Martin Helme, he not only denounces the EU as an undemocratic entity, 
but also compares it to the former USSR.121  
 Another key aspect of Martin Helme’s interview was his brief description of how 
the party acme into being. At one point he described how, “We learned that it would have 
been vulnerable to outside manipulations sort of the deepstate it would have been corrupted 
by the deep state.”122 This helps illustrate the mindset of the party. The idea that the central 
government potentially is able to access and manipulate the various parties, including 
EKRE, plays into the populist message of EKRE. Helme portrays the government as a 
collection of unelected individuals secretly controlling society. 
 Jaak Madison’s answers in the background questions reveal a slightly different 
motivation for joining EKRE. When he was deciding between which party to join, he said 
of EKRE, “or [I could] join with an absolutely new party who doesn’t have anything 
almost with no money no popularity but you can do what you think is the right thing to 
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do.”123 For Jaak Madison, his decision to join EKRE was highly influenced by his potential 
ability to become a prominent member in the party. This is not to say that Madison does 
not believe in the statements that he makes, but rather it indicates what attracted him to the 
party at such a young age.  
Analysis of Euroscepticism in the interviews 
 This is one of the three major components of this thesis: to both prove that EKRE is 
hard-Eurosceptic party. Various sub-codes were devised that illustrate how EKRE fits in 
with the other hard-Eurosceptic parties within Europe and the EU. The sub-codes for this 
main code include: “undemocratic,” “limit integration,” and “cultural Marxism.” This 
illustrates the core terms that the party uses when it is trying to discredit the legitimacy of 
the European Union and portray its goals as antithetical to the prosperity of the various 
member states. By using these specific codes, the politicians that were interviewed 
illustrated that they have a fundamental problem with how the EU is structured and 
functions. It is less a case of soft-Euroscepticism in which there is criticism towards only a 
few policies. As stated by the Sussex school of party-based Euroscepticism, if the party and 
its members are fundamentally opposed to the current integration progress of the EU, then 
they must be categorized as hard Eurosceptics.124   
 Throughout the interview process, there was one common theme voiced about the 
European Union. That is the idea that the EU is an undemocratic entity, especially the 
European Commission. Jaak Madison exclaimed in his interview, “the biggest problem is 
that we have the most un-democratic institution and that is the European commission 
which is actually believing that states are somehow enemies…or they are against 
integration…they are seeing that smaller national states are too closed and they are looking 
on their own interests.”125 This quotation illustrates a feeling that Europe’s institutions, 
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specifically the European Commission, alienates the rights of the individual nation states of 
the European Union. This quotation does not exist in isolation either.  
 This helps lead to the conclusion that, based on Taggart and Szczerbiak’s 
definition, EKRE is a hard-Eurosceptic party. The various claims that the EU and its 
institutions are un-democratic lead to the conclusion that EKRE is, “being opposed to the 
whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived.” For the key party 
members to describe the EU as an “undemocratic and socialist entity,” and that Brussels to 
be committing “power grabs,” infers that the party believes the EU must radically 
restructure its internal composition and integration patterns. 
Of course, the official party line does not emphasize a departure or exit from the 
EU. In fact, EKRE does not advocate for any form of divorce from the European Union. 
However, as mentioned before in the literature review chapter, the fact that EKRE does not 
directly advocate for an exit from the EU does not mean it cannot be classified as a hard-
Eurosceptic party. Due to Estonia’s size and economic structure, there would be no party, 
no matter how Eurosceptic, that would advocate for the country’s exit. Therefore, within 
the context of a small, Baltic Sea country, EKRE is very much a hard-Eurosceptic party. 
Earlier in the thesis, Clive Archer’s explanation of Euroscepticism in the Nordic 
countries helps further explain how EKRE can be classified as Eurosceptic. Since his 
definition involves gauging how opposed to European integration a country is, it is 
possible to see how EKRE can be classified as a Eurosceptic party. Of course, with EKRE, 
there is the obvious rejection of political and cultural integration within the EU. In 
Archer’s scale of Euroscepticism (a scale of 1-11 with 11 being the most enthusiastic about 
integration and 1 being the least enthusiastic), EKRE at the very least, places no higher 
than a 5, based solely on their cultural rhetoric.126 However, it becomes less clear when it 
comes to the more economically based guides on the scale. Throughout the interviews, 
neither candidate directly addressed any potential economic threats posed by the EU nor 
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did they make any statements that criticized the customs union or the Eurozone. Jaak 
Madison even stated that there needs to be some form of free trade and economic Union.127   
 However, Martin Helme did allude to the supposed dangers of the current economic 
policies of the EU. He exclaimed how, 
“The other thing of course is that the EU is very similar to the USSR in that 
one size fits all. You have the same interest rates in Ireland Portugal and 
Germany that’s nuts that is absolutely nuts that’s the reason why the 
countries are bankrupt that’s the reason for all the banking crisis you have 
similar standards for agriculture in countries like Finland were you have 
polar nights and countries like Italy and Spain where you have deserts.”128 
 This quotation helps puts EKRE’s thoughts on economics into perspective. This 
would suggest that EKRE should be placed on the lower end of Archer’s Eurosceptic scale 
(indicating that it is a Eurosceptic party). Of course, it is only Martin Helme who made this 
claim, so the logical counter argument is that he does not represent the economic views of 
the party or the other leaders. However, the preceding quotation fits into the ideas that the 
EU is trying to subsume its member states and infringe on their sovreignity. Additionally, 
because of the strict hierarchy of the party, it is easy to make the claim that his views 
reflect the direction of the party. 
 Another way in which to examine EKRE’s classification as a hard-Eurosceptic 
party is to examine the other European parties that it identifies with and sees as potential 
allies in the European Parliament. As Martin Helme stated, “My favorite government right 
now in Europe of course is in Italy and but it is encouraging to see the Austrian 
governments the Czech government the Polish government you probably start looking 
from your allies form that circle.”129 The various governments that were mentioned by 
Helme in this statement, with the exception of perhaps the Czech government, are all 
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widely known for clashing with the European Union. The fact that both Martin Helme and 
Jaak Madison feel more comfortable associating with these parties speaks to the world 
view of these men who help shape the direction of EKRE.  
Analysis of Nativism: 
 This set of analysis focuses on the nativist themes that serve to explore the rhetoric 
used by EKRE and how it fuels its Eurosceptic views. As previously stated throughout the 
thesis, this analysis will illustrate that this party chooses to either directly use nativist 
rhetoric or to indirectly invoke it using specific language and phrases. For this political 
party, it perceives cultural threats represent a true danger for the country. Ideas such as 
multiculturalism and immigration are the concepts that pose the greatest danger to the 
country. While the cultural threats of globalization often came up during the interviews, the 
economic threats of this phenomenon very rarely, if ever did. 
Various sub-codes are additionally used throughout the interviews that help support 
this idea that nativist issues are what dominate EKRE’s rise to power. For the issue of 
demographics, sub-codes were said that hinted at how the party and its leadership viewed 
minorities and how an Estonian majority had to be maintained. Common sub-codes that 
were utilized here include, “preserve Estonia,” “family values,” and “immigration.” This 
illustrates the main principles that the party believes must be followed in order to achieve a 
cohesive state. As some of their direct quotations will illustrate, a country can only be 
viable and successful if it is a relatively homogeneous state.   
 One of the questions that was posed to the respondents regarding socio-cultural 
issues was what the respondents viewed as the biggest threat to Estonia was. While Jaak 
Madison responded that it was the military threat posed by Russia, Martin Helme 
responded in a very different manner. During his interview, he stated that, “the long-term 
threat is demographics. Everything boils down to demographics… that is the main issue 
that should overarch everything. If we don’t have enough kids, nothing we do has any 
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point.”130 This quotation drives at the heart of EKRE’s philosophy. The idea that the 
Estonian nation is at risk of being erased in its own state is a fear that is not only expressed 
by these individuals, but by the party itself.  
Another author who can offer some insight into this is Louis Wierenga. In his text 
on EKRE, the author discusses the idea of ethnofuturism. According to the author, this 
concept refers to the idea in where,  
“nationalist doctrine [is] intended to create a new European civilization 
based upon identity and roots and led by Eastern Europe.” Additionally, the 
driving idea behind this idea is that, “Bringing about the destruction of both 
American and Russian imperialism and replacing them with white 
ethnostates is a goal of ethnofuturism.”131  
It is here that some of the motivations of EKRE’s rhetoric can become apparent. Of course, 
none of the members came out and directly said that they desired a purely white ethno-state 
(Jaak Madison even noted with enthusiasm that EKRE contained a handful of non-
Estonians). However, the party’s, and especially Martin Helme’s, fear about demographic 
proportions illustrate a desire to create an almost purely homogeneous nation state. 
In this context, it would make perfect sense as to why the party would pursue the 
hard-Eurosceptic pathway that it has. The creation of an ethnically homogeneous state 
would require the rejection and reversal of many of the EU’s current integration policies 
and supranational tendencies. This view is echoed by Martin Helme when, during his 
interview, stated how, “We can’t compare ourselves to Germany with its eighty-five 
million population milder climate better capitalization of industry and stuff like…we have 
no chance of competing with them but we have our own advantages we are small and 
dynamic.”132 This quotation underlines the idea that the various nation states that comprise 
the country are too heterogeneous to be forced to comply to the same rules under one 
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supranational organization. Therefore, a very prominent and clearly defined nation state is 
the only way to truly prosper. This, of course, is runs counter to the pro-integrationist and 
pro-EU groups that are found in the country.   
While demographics play a large role in its Eurosceptic attitudes, there are other 
key components to their socio-cultural motivated Euroscepticism. One of these is the idea 
of sovreignity. This is a key issue for many conservative, right-wing, and Eurosceptic 
parties. EKRE, like most of these other parties, frames the EU as an organization that 
restricts the freedoms and independence of Estonia. During the interview, both politicians 
lamented how the EU imposes its laws and world views onto the Estonian people. As a 
result, there were key sub-codes that emerged that can be classified under sovreignity. 
 The vast majority of the terms that can be categorized under this code have to do 
with maintaining borders and promoting the primacy of the nation-state. Therefore, sub-
codes such as “immigration control,” “invasion,” and “nation-state” are all integral aspects 
of their opinions. As will be showcased, this emerges from the idea that the EU is an 
oppressive supranational entity that attempts to strip autonomy from its member states in 
an effort to establish its own laws.   
Additionally, the interview subjects voiced their beliefs that the EU was threatening 
to become a federalized entity rather than the intergovernmental organization that it 
currently is. Jaak Madison said in his interview that, “they haven’t understand the main 
problems that they have done and if we don’t solve the problems of outside borders 
or…federalization.”133 This plays into the idea that the EU is a massive and oppressive 
system that attempts to strip states of their sovreignity. 
 By playing on this fear of a supranational entity encroaching on the freedoms of its, 
especially smaller, members states, the top party brass of EKRE are actually taking 
advantage of a certain phenomenon. As Karlis Bukovskis notes in the book 
“Euroscepticism in Small EU Member States,” “European integration has resulted in a 
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complicated framework of rules and regulations…Humans naturally fear and dislike issues 
they do not understand, especially if those issues are often seen as unfair.”134 The EU is a 
mass of beuracracy and regulation that appears at many times to be incredibly tedious. By 
greatly simplifying the EU as a force that is attempting to consume its member states. 
 Martin Helme echoes this fear when he exclaims that the EU barrages Estonia with 
countless laws and regulations that inhibit the independence of the country. He exclaimed 
how he, “find(s) it absolutely repugnant that we have some 8000 directives and 
6000…anyways we have, well of a ¼ of a million pages of legislation most of them are 
EU.”135  Of course, the obvious implication of this statement is that the EU forces states to 
conform to its laws and regulations at the expense of its own ability to create legislation.  
 The third form of expressing Euroscepticism through nativist expressions can be 
found in how the respondents viewed tradition and tried to promote traditional ways of life. 
They expressed concerns about tradition many times in the same way that they portrayed 
the issue of sovreignity. That is, the supranational EU attempting to impose its own values 
onto Estonia, thereby erasing the uniqueness of the country. Jaak Madison echoed this 
sentiment in the interview when he exclaimed how, the party’s promotion of traditional 
party values is a key aspect of EKRE.136 Of course, there is the fact that by promoting 
“traditional values,” the party appears to be representing the common people. They are not 
trying to bring in foreign or alien ideas but are rather defending the Estonian people from 
the “liberals” of the EU. 
 Like the previous description of codes, this code contains various expected sub-
codes that correspond to the promotion of more conventional norms. For instance, “Luther-
ism,” “family,” and “alien” are all sub-codes that emerge during the various discussions. 
As will be shown when the interviews are analyzed in depth, this fear of more traditional 
values being uprooted by a new set of values. Of course, the EU earns the brunt of the 
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criticism from the party. Throughout the interviews, the interview subjects believed that the 
values that made Estonia unique were being eroded away by foreign forces.  
 Martin Helme encapsulates this feeling in his interview. He states that, “the heritage 
generally the Lutherian work ethics which I have to say regretfully the decline of 
lutherianism is declining as well.”137 Here, the desire, and in some ways deification, of a 
supposed past attribute of the region and people plays an important role in the world view 
of this politician. This is not the only allusion to tradition. In both interviews, the idea of 
the traditional family (marriage between a man and woman) are constantly discussed.  
 This promotion of family values largely manifests itself in the opposition of gay 
marriage (specifically the cohabitation law of 2014) and the maintenance of gender roles. 
In his article about EKRE, Kaasekamp writes, regarding the Istanbul Convention, that, 
“prominent EKRE leader, Urmas Espenberg, referred to the conspiracy of “feminists and 
liberal socialists” that is subverting traditional gender roles, propagating childlessness, and 
causing general moral decadence.”138 He additionally writes how, “roles, EKRE uses the 
classical conservative frames: biological determinism of heterosexual relations and 
argumentum ad antiquitatem…It is a typical identity-frame of the contemporary radical 
right that depicts the majority group (indigenous heterosexual families) threatened and 
suppressed by minority groups (gays, feminists, childless couples).”139 
 Throughout the interviews the interview subjects, especially Martin Helme, pushed 
the idea of these new values posing a threat to society was a constant worry for them. Of 
course, the EU was to blame for this influx of anti-Estonian beliefs. Helme states in the 
interview that the EU is naturally going to promote these values due to its nature. He 
stated, “Plus you add to that the regulated left-wing progressive cultural Marxist ideology 
that they are enforcing quite happily and quite openly.”140 This allows EKRE to position 
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itself as the defenders of Estonian values and against the inherent goals and policies of the 
European Union. 
However, not every academic believes that the socio-cultural dog whistles are 
behind EKRE’s rise to prominence. One author is Siim Trumm. In his paper, he writes 
about the factors that cause individuals to vote for this party. In his paper, the author writes 
that, “Whereas mistrust of the political establishment was a key driver of electoral support 
for EKRE, as was opposition to the adoption of socially liberal policies, Euroscepticism 
and antiimmigration feelings were not.”141 This, of course, directly goes against part of the 
claims made by this thesis. There are two ways to counter this. The first, is to look at the 
article composed by Kaskekaamp et al. In it, they write that, “EKRE has capitalized on 
four primary issues of value priorities in Estonian society to “light the fuse” (Pytlas and 
Kossack, 2015) and capitalize on socio-cultural cleavages.”142 Those four issues are: anti-
Russian stance, refugees, European integration, and family values.143 These researchers 
found that these were the primary messages that were featured on the party’s social media 
outlets. This showcases that EKRE believes that these are the main messages for attracting 
votes (and judging by their recent parliamentary success it has worked). 
 The second way to counter Trumm’s argument is to look at the interviews 
themselves. In the interview, Jaak Madison stated, “we have like very big support for 
traditional family values.”144 This supports the claims made by Kasekaamp in his article. 
Since EKRE frames the EU as a bastion of anti-traditional values, it can then frame 
European integration as a force that threatens Estonian values. Once again, Kasekaamp 
writes of EKRE’s portrayal of European integration as something, “that destroys “nation-
states.” Dietmar Loch and Ov Cristian Norocel (2015) note that a significant link exists 
between the success of the PRR in Europe and de-nationalization.”145 
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Populism:  
 The final area that needs to be examined is the populist rhetoric that was utilized by 
the two interview subjects. While many of the preceding codes and quotation that have 
been used can be described as populist in nature, for this section, rhetoric that specifically 
targets the “elite” or attempts to appeal to the “common man” shall be analyzed. Jaak 
Madison, when defending the use of direct-style democracy, claimed that, “today I think 
the problem is that the people are getting this political propaganda for two months before 
the elections and then for three and half years there is nothing you can collect your 
signatures and make the news but if you don’t like this policy but you can’t make 
anything”146 This is illustrative of one of the ways in which EKRE attempts to garner 
popular support. By claiming to advocate for a political system that tries to accommodate 
the people’s will, EKRE is directly claiming that the current system, and therefore the 
current political class, do not.  
 Martin Helme echoes these beliefs in his interview as well. He noted how EKRE is, 
“the only party in Estonia, at least only party in the parliament, that has the members vote 
the candidate list.  I think it is rather a radical departure from what the others are doing and 
I think that it is part of our success.”147 This argument is similar to the argument that is 
made about direct democracy. EKRE is able to portray itself as the voice of the people 
because they allow all of the party members to vote for its candidates. This way they are 
able to portray their opposition as out-of-touch and dismissive of their own constituents.  
 In addition to these quotations, there are many examples of codes that fall under the 
category of populism. As expected, many of the sub-codes that are utilized in this section 
have to deal with the idea of appealing to the people while targeting and berating the “elite 
ruling class.” For instance, such terms as “people’s support,” and “waste of taxes,” are 
phrases that point to the party trying to appeal to the common citizen. Meanwhile, sub-
codes such as, “deep state” and “recalling officials” serve to highlight opposition to an 
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ignorant and self-serving elite. Oftentimes, these codes are tied in with many of the party’s 
more Eurosceptic views. This helps illustrate that the party’s populist rhetoric cannot be 
separated from its Euroscepticism.  
 Cas Mudde’s conceptualization and theory on the populist radical right can be 
implemented in analyzing this populism. Mudde’s examination of populist parties can be 
summed up when he writes, “Grand Coalitions are perfectly democratic…but they can 
further strengthen the appeal of the populist parties by leaving them as the only real 
opposition.”148 This is a scenario that perfectly encapsulates the situation in Estonia (in 
both the 2015 and 2019 elections). In the country there are numerous parties across the 
political spectrum. However, all of them broadly support the EU and many of its 
integration policies. Therefore, EKRE can be seen as a way to voice the general 
dissatisfaction with the current system. It is important to remember, however, that just 
because a party is populist or utilizes populist rhetoric, does not necessarily mean that it is 
Eurosceptic or right-wing. There are numerous examples of left-wing parties that utilize 
populism in their platforms.   
 All of these codes and phrases that were utilized by EKRE during the private one-
on-one interviews with the researcher must be combined with other, more public displays 
of populism. This is because in this thesis, populism is defined as a political style in which 
politicians use bad manners, appeal to the people, and try to present a crisis. Moffit 
provides a chart in his text that highlights how these politicians present themselves with 
these tools to the media.149  
Populism as a Political style Corresponding Aspects of Media Logic 
Appeal to the people 
Dramatization and polarization 
Prioritize conflict 
Anti-establishment attitude 
Bad Manners Personalization 
Stereotypization 
Emotionalization 
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Crisis, breakdown, threat 
Intensification 
Simplification 
Focus on scandals 
EKRE has shown that it is willing to utilize these tactics when it is exposed to the media. 
For instance, in a March 2019 interview with Deutsche Welle, Martin Helme utilized all of 
the above techniques when being questioned by the reporter. In order to appeal to the 
people, Helme used language such as, “And you trust the government always” and “the 
government lies.”150 This presents an anti-establishment message that directly implies that 
the government should not always be trusted. In regards to bad manners, in the interview, 
Martin Helme dismisses two of his critics as “arch-liberals.”151 This serves to stereotype 
his rivals. Finally, when presenting a crisis, at one point in the interview, Helme states, in 
regards to immigrants that, “it doesn’t make any difference to us who they are…whether 
they are from Ukraine or from Nigeria, It’s the matter that they are not Estonians.”152   
 Mart Helme also utilized these tools of populism when addressing the media. For 
instance, he stated, “Kersti Kaljulaid isn't just a woman, but rather the President of the 
Republic. She reads one article, is so emotionally upset as a woman that she immediately 
passes judgment on the fly."153 Once again, this plays into the populist use of media in two 
ways. First, it satisfies the idea of bad manners. Helme is personalizing his attack on the 
president and is arguably playing into the stereotype of the hyper-emotional woman. 
However, it also plays into how the populist party utilizes the media. As Moffit writes, 
“populist leaders can become quasi-celebrities, known as much-or sometimes more-for 
their media performances and stylistic outbursts.”154 The statement made by Mart Helme 
helps prove this aspect of populism as a performance by utilizing this quotation. The 
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language chosen was specifically designed to garner attention as there would have been 
other, less controversial language.  
Conclusion: 
 The findings of this chapter help shed light onto the EKRE political party, its 
motivations, and its position on the political spectrum. First, the answers that were 
provided by the interviewees decisively show that the party is a hard-Eurosceptic party. 
Between the amount of hard-Eurosceptic terms used and the specific language utilized by 
the party, it is hard to argue with the idea that EKRE is anything but an organization that is 
firmly opposed to the idea of future European integration and even wants to see the current 
EU reformed. All of the statements made easily fall into the hard-Eurosceptic category 
conceived by Taggart and Szczerbiak.  
The second main findings of this chapter showcase how important socio-cultural 
stances and beliefs are for this party in its desire to attract votes. The codes for tradition, 
sovreignity, and demographics were all prominently discussed during the interview. 
Demographics was the code that was especially prominent throughout the interviews. This 
helps to discount the idea that economics plays a large role in the support for EKRE. 
Throughout the interview, the politicians being questioned had various opportunities to 
discuss the economic downsides of globalization and European integration. However, they 
chose to focus on cultural issues. 
Finally, the numerous populist terms that were utilized helped reinforce the fact that 
EKRE is a populist party that attempts to appeal to the “common” people. This manifested 
itself in populistic codes that both attacked the “elites” and their institutions as well as 
support the average Estonian. While this was not part of the two main research questions 
that this thesis posed, it was important to make the connection that EKRE was a populist 
radical right party. The analysis of this party illustrates that even in countries that are a 
bastion of EU support, there is a potential for a strong Eurosceptic party to emerge. 
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Conclusion 
The rise of a hard-Eurosceptic party in Estonia has been rapid. At first, the increase 
of populist radical right parties had bypassed the northern Baltic country. The 
parliamentary elections of 2015 and 2019 proved that EKRE has the ability to consistently 
attract voters and is a now a prominent voice in Estonian politics. This paper attempted to 
examine this party and what policies it used to catapult it into this successful position. 
Emerging from the old nationalist party, EKRE was able to sweep to prominence by using 
nativist rhetoric and talking points in order to a capture a large segment of the Estonian 
population who felt that the old parties of the country were largely ignoring their voices 
and concerns. 
Of course, while EKRE and its various sister parties have been labelled as 
Eurosceptic, it is important to conceptualize and define what is meant by Eurosceptic. First, 
the definition provided by Clive Archer was the most appropriate for examining a small 
Baltic state such as Estonia. This implies that while no party would advocate for Estonia’s 
exit from the EU, a Eurosceptic party can still oppose different levels of integration. The 
next step was to define what is meant by hard and soft-Euroscepticism. While this paper 
discussed and analyzed the various definitions that have been provided by numerous 
authors (such as Leonard Ray, Petr Kopecky, and Cas Mudde), the definition provided by 
Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak proved to be the most useful for this study. Finally, the 
idea of nativism was defined by Hans-Georg Betz. 
In order to prove the two research questions that were posed by this paper, semi-
structured in-depth interviews were conducted with prominent ranking politicians within 
the EKRE political party. After the interviews were conducted, they were examined for 
codes that dealt with hard-Euroscepticism, concerns over sovreignity, demographics, and 
maintaining tradition, and populism. These codes were found throughout the interviews 
and served to confirm the notion that EKRE is both a hard-Eurosceptic party, and one that 
relies on socio-cultural fears to garner votes. Additionally, the party also is comfortable 
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using populist policies and often advocates for measures to be taken against the “elites” 
and to serve the “common people.”  
The question that follows is: why does this study matter? This is a single case 
study, so its ability to make generalizations is severely limited. Additionally, this is a single 
case study of a small country that has one of the smallest economies and populations in the 
European Union. Despite this list of potential drawbacks, this thesis does address key 
issues. The first is that, a single case study such as this helps prove that even in an open 
and relatively successful economy, a far-right party can still emerge and pray on cultural 
and societal fears. The second issue that this thesis addresses is that it shows a Eurosceptic 
party does not have to advocate for a country’s exit from the union in order to be hard-
Eurosceptic. If a party such as EKRE consistently opposes the construction of the EU and 
believes that the organization is fundamentally flawed, it does not have to advocate for 
Estonia’s exit to be viewed as a hard-Eurosceptic party. 
The third major point of this paper was more theoretical. This thesis helped prove 
that Taggart and Szczerbiak’s conceptualization can be applied to this specific case. The 
importance of this is twofold. First, it showcases that Taggart and Szczerbiak’s form of 
examining parties is still valid and, despite the presence of other conceptualizations of 
Euroscepticism. The second reason that this is important is because, as mentioned earlier, 
this thesis helped illustrate that interviews can be a useful and applicable tool when 
utilizing Taggart and Szczerbiak’s conceptualization of hard and soft-Euroscepticism. By 
using the single case study of Estonia, this paper has contributed to the theory that initially 
used speeches and party literature as the primary tool for placing a party on the spectrum of 
Euroscepticism.  
The final question is, what does the future hold? Now that EKRE is firmly 
established as a viable and influential party, what next? As of this writing, EKRE is part of 
the government as a coalition member alongside Isamaa and the Center Party. While 
EKRE has professed that it has various redlines that it will not cross, it is highly unlikely 
that it will be able to enforce these redlines. A common theory is that once far-right and 
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overtly populist parties come to power, they are forced to moderate their stances. However, 
an April 6th coalition plan stated that Estonia will not take any refugees and a referendum 
was set to take place in 2021 that would ask if marriage should be between a man and a 
woman (a direct attack against the cohabitation bill of 2014).155 This inclusion of a 
referendum also points to the party’s wish for a more direct-style democracy being at least 
partially fulfilled. What these coalition talks have shown is that EKRE has had a drastic 
influence on the Estonian political field. While it is impossible to say whether this will be a 
permanent rightward shift for Estonia, in the short to medium term, it is hard to argue that 
EKRE has not achieved its goal of bringing Eurosceptic sentiments to the forefront of 
Estonian society. 
Populist radical right parties that utilize Euroscepticism are now prominent 
throughout the EU. All throughout Europe there are parties that view Brussels with a 
tremendous amount of trepidation and hesitancy. This is especially true in eastern Europe. 
What was once viewed as a bastion of pro-EU sentiment, the former communist countries 
now have begun to follow their western European counterparts. However, it is impossible 
to know whether this uptick is merely a trend or if it is indicative of how society will look 
in the future. That is why studies such as these are important. They allow future researchers 
to examine what allowed developments in specific countries to occur.      
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Appendix 1 
Interview Questions: 
Background Questions: 
Could you please give us some background information on yourself? What made you want to go 
into politics? 
And what was your experience with politics before joining (and or leading) the EKRE political 
party?  
What attracted you to EKRE? 
 
Questions regarding society: 
Can you please describe for me, what it means to be Estonian? Specifically, what are the cultural 
traits or specific attributes that makes Estonia and the Estonians so unique? How will EKRE 
maintain the Estonian-ness in both the EU and the world at large? 
How would you describe your party’s view on the Russian minority in Estonia? Do they have a 
place in Estonian society? Would you describe them as different from the Muslim minority in 
Estonia and in Europe as a whole? 
What is the biggest threat currently facing Estonia? 
 
Party policy questions: 
Of course, one must ask, how EKRE hopes to expand and bring in new people? Estonia has a 
very high level of EU approval among its citizenry. Is this an obstacle?  
What is the importance of the Blue Awakening group in the party’s strategy? 
Can you describe what actions and policies your party will enact if it would ever won a majority 
in parliament and be the dominant party in the country? What parties in the EU does EKRE 
either looks to emulate or identifies with? 
Would you be willing to be part of a coalition government? Would the party change any of its 
party policies to gain a position of power? 
EKRE advocates for a direct democracy in Estonia. Why is this? What are the benefits and 
drawbacks? 
 
EU questions:  
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In your own words, how would you describe the general position of EKRE? What does it wish to 
accomplish with its stated goals and potential policies?  
Do you believe that there is a democratic deficit in the EU?  
In the past, there has been talk of a pan-European army that could exist alongside NATO. Would 
your party support this? 
It is often said that the EU is an elite-driven organization. Do you feel that these elites ignore the 
needs and desires of the common people? How would EKRE solve this problem? 
If EKRE was able to enter the European Parliament, are there any specific parties that you would 
look to join? What actions would you take once in the parliament? 
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Appendix 2 
Code List: 
Jaak Madison Interview: 
Phrase Sub-code Code 
So, the small national 
movement joined with the 
farmers party and that made 
us a new party with a new 
party name and programme 
and new leaders 
New Party Miscellaneous 
and we are growing more and 
more but it started in 2013 for 
me. 
 
Fast Growth Miscellaneous 
time I knew that I would be 
known as a young member 
who has to act as the leaders 
say or to join with an 
absolutely new party who 
doesn’t have anything almost 
with no money no popularity 
but you can do what you think 
is the right thing to do 
Opportunity Miscellaneous 
you can’t be any part of 
nationality just overnight. So, 
I can speak Swedish but I can 
never be Swedish. so even if I 
move to Sweden and I live 
there I cannot be Swedish. 
Because I would be an 
Estonian in Sweden 
Requirement Demographics 
So Estonian as a nationality, 
of course at least one parent 
should be Estonian and of 
course you should speak 
Estonian.  
Requirement Demographics 
So of course you have to feel 
this connection and this 
identity like with Estonian 
culture and history. Like, so, 
this very deep thing you feel 
inside and that’s part of the 
nationality what we are 
saying.  
Connection Tradition 
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And I think sometimes its 
very similar to the Jews like in 
Israel as they are identifying 
We are not saying that your 
mother and father must be 
Estonian and then you are 
Estonian as they are doing or 
your mother has to be a Jew 
and then you can be a Jew 
otherwise you are not a Jew. 
But otherwise the biggest part 
of nationality is at least one 
parent has to be Estonian. 
Requirement  Demographics 
We are, our party is the most 
Euro-realistic. Some are 
saying a skeptical or populist 
party against the European 
Union but its not very correct 
because we are saying that too 
much integration can’t be 
good for every country and 
every nationality 
Euro-realist Soft Euroscepticism 
limit of the integration Limit integration Hard Eurosceticism 
So sometimes it feels that 
some kind of ideologies 
parties are just dreaming to 
make European Union as a 
copy paste of United States. 
Fighting elites Populism 
for the Estonians we have 
only about 900,000 so under 
one million so even like in 
European Union, Estonia is 
like a second place where the 
people are not Estonians. So 
Latvia is the first place. I think 
they have about 40% are not 
Latvian, especially the 
Russians. We have about 
25%. Even In Germany, non-
Germans are about 6-7% of 
the population. so for the 
smaller countries and 
nationalities too much 
integration is a risk. 
Non-Estonians Demographics 
un-democratic institution as 
the European commission 
who is really believing that  
Undemocratic Hard-Euroscepticism 
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states are somehow enemies 
or against federalization in the 
EU or that they are against 
integration so and of course 
they are seeing that smaller 
national states are too closed 
and they are looking on their 
own interests  
great future in EU when we 
have the one minister of 
finance like the French guys 
are dreaming now we don’t 
want a federal army like 
European Union like NATO 
so and of course the EC the 
president and VP can’t really 
understand 
European Commission Cannot 
Understand 
Soft-Euroscepticism 
Like in Germany you can’t 
really understand what it is 
like to be in Luxembourg, the 
smallest state in the EU  
Small state Sovreignity 
So with the muslim 
community in Europe that is 
one of the few questions 
where Estonians and Russians 
in Estonia where we are of the 
same opinion 
Europeans versus aliens Tradition 
So with the Russians, we have 
three types of Russians. We 
don’t have any problem with 
the first part of Russians who 
are very well integrated. They 
are very well integrated, they 
are speaking Estonian they are 
working here and paying 
taxes. They are normal 
citizens who want to be living 
in Estonia and not looking 
over to border to Russian 
society 
Proportions Demographics 
So, the third part is the biggest 
problem who are living in the 
most part, who are getting 
news from Russian media. So 
they are getting up in the 
morning and watching 
Russian news on TV and they 
are reading Russian 
Threatening Estonia Demographics 
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newspapers. So, they are 
getting information from the 
other side and it is not very 
friendly to about Estonia and 
they are the biggest problem 
actually and of course that has 
been a part of the political 
games for the past 25 years  
So it has been hard for the 
children of Russian families 
who are going to the Russian 
kindergartens and Russian 
schools finishing their schools 
and are in a pretty bad 
situation because it is almost 
impossible to get into 
universities or into the labor 
market to get the same 
possibilities as Estontians 
have 
Heterogenity Demographics 
getting but the main problem 
is language. So there are 
different kinds of Russians 
But yea, we don’t see any 
problem, you can be Chinese 
or even Japanese, like I said 
we have national language and 
EE constitutions and we are 
accepting that. It doesn’t 
matter where you are or what 
national language you are 
talking at home. 
Preserve Estonian Language Demographics 
we have to start from KD. 
There has to be the same 
school system. We can’t 
imagine that we have the 
double school system like in 
the US where the Mexicans 
are only speaking Spanish and 
they will not speak English. 
Or like in Germany where you 
have different school systems 
that you can learn only in 
Turkish and you don’t know 
anything about German. But 
this is the problem that we 
have in EE 
Assimilation Demographics 
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Like we have Russians who 
are finishing the school but 
are spending 3-4 hours per 
week (learning EE) but its 
hard when you don’t have any 
friends and like 
communication in the EE 
language. We have the same 
problem. We have to learn RU 
in the 6th grade but of course it 
is not enough if you are not 
using this language you are 
not getting anything. 
Family Values Tradition 
conservative like the right 
wing party and of course like 
the conservative values we 
have like very big support for 
traditional family values 
Family values Tradition 
With European policy it is 
going to be like our position is 
very similar with the Polish 
guys and also FPO of Austria 
so we have relations with 
them 
Similar Parties Hard-Euroscepticism 
So we have never said we 
need to leave the EU like the 
British guys did, but we have 
to take a few steps back in 
history 
Steps back Hard Euroscepticism 
We need economic union and 
free trade and that’s the main 
reason why the EU was made 
on 50s. Today it is very 
political system where you are 
working with parliaments 
where over 50% of the laws 
we are making here it is 
coming from the EU laws so 
that’s even average questions 
of life is regulated at the 
European level and there’s 
some question is it fair or is it 
needed to do it and of course 
in this topic we are very 
conservative. 
EU Laws Hard Euroscepticism 
do you agree that EE should 
say no to the laws of the EU 
even if we lose money and 
Approval Rating Hard Euroscepticism 
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64% of the people said yes. 
We have to say no to the laws 
of the EU even if we lose 
money. So it means that 2/3 
are saying we must take a step 
back and that we went too far 
with integration  
So there is a big support for 
the union but for the EU as a 
union of independent states. 
So that’s why we don’t have 
any problems with new 
members of the party. It has 
been growing I think we have 
the most new members of any 
party. So I think from last 
summer of 2018 we got about 
570 new members, so more 
than you need for a new party. 
Somewhere is limits is the 
support but we can say it is 
about 25-30%. 
 
Independent States Hard Euroscepticism 
It depends on the results of the 
reform party and the center 
party is getting. if there is a 
possibility that they can form 
a government with just the 
two parties, the center party 
and the reform party, then 
they will not prefer our party 
Being Part of the Government Miscellaneous 
When you are 15 you can join 
the movement between 15 and 
18 and when you are 18 you 
can join directly with the party 
and that’s why we’re 
supporting joining directly 
with the party so they are not 
so, they are not part of the 
future strategy of the party 
Not part of Future Miscellaneous 
What we know today is that 
there is going to be a new 
political group after the 
elections because the ECR is 
broken because the UK is 
leaving and they had the 
biggest power in the ECR also 
in the ECR they have Polish 
Similar parties Hard Euroscepticism 
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guys and Finns party the True 
Finns and they both know the 
ECR is pointless because they 
don’t have the British and 
they know that the main point 
is to work together like the 
FPO and AfD and Lega Nord 
those three parties are together 
so they’re trying to cooperate 
now to try and get new parties 
into a new political group with 
the PiS party, Finns party and 
probably our party because if 
the Finns are joining with a 
new group together with FPO 
and AFD it means that the 
also the Swedish and Danish 
parties are also joining 
For us it is easier to be part of 
a political group if we also 
have the Finns there and 
Polish guys, especially I like 
their Russian policy. 
Especially there we have 
different views than the 
Italians and Austrians. But 
probably it will be a new 
political group with those 
parties 
Similar parties Hard Euroscepticism 
Of course I think there are 
many things that we have to 
look over especially there is 
like the simple thing like free 
moving in the Schengen area 
it’s a nice thing but it doesn’t 
work when the member states 
aren’t following the rules. So 
like for one rule saying that 
you have to protector your 
outside borders when you 
want to be part of Schengen 
but we see today that Greece 
and Italy does not protect its 
outside borders so but if we 
see we have states who do not 
follow the rules with the 
Schengen rules, then that for 
the two weeks you can restore 
your border controls 
Borders Hard Euroscepticism 
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it is problematic that you have 
to ask the EC for permission 
to restore your border control 
if its needed also the Eurozone 
policy, how should we go 
forward. Especially if there is 
a new financial crisis like we 
had in Greece. So should we 
like really save all the banks 
in Greece what is very useful 
only for the Germans or we 
have to make it clearer that we 
cant burn our money and our 
taxpayers money in the EU to 
the European banks because 
they were making bad loans.  
Dominant European 
Commission 
Hard Euroscepticism 
and our idea is very pretty 
much a copy past from the old 
constitution of the 20s and 
also from the constitution of 
Switzerland so the main idea 
has been always that there has 
to be some key for the people 
between the elections 
The past Tradition 
Today I think we have the 
main problem is that the 
people are getting this 
political propaganda and 
campaign for two months 
before the elections and then 
for three and half years there 
is nothing so you can collect 
your signatures and make 
some letters or the news but if 
you don’t like this policy but 
you can’t make anything.  
Key for the people Populism 
I think that the very risky way 
the EU is making now is 
getting larger and getting new 
member states especially from 
the western Balkan 
Risk Soft-Euroscepticism 
So it has been the way of the 
policy of the next 5-10 to get 
new states like Albania or 
Kosovo and BH and I think it 
is a very risky way because if 
we haven’t solve the problems 
Oppose further integration Hard-Euroscepticism 
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that we have today and we 
have the Brexit 2.5 years  
EC like Timmermans like 
okay it is very easy to say the 
biggest problem of Brexit was 
the populist movements and 
lying to the people and okay 
you can say that it’s their fault 
but have you done also done 
something wrong from the EC 
that the millions of brits are 
not believing anymore in the 
EC and the EU and like, No 
no they still haven’t 
understand the main problems 
that they have done and if we 
don’t solve the problems of 
outside borders, or the 
Schengen zone or the 
Eurozone crisis 
European Commission out of 
touch 
Hard Euroscepticism 
we are moving and in the 
same time to play on the idea 
to get new member states in 
the Union I don’t think it’s a 
very right way to so because 
it’s the question of what 
happens when the next 
country says no we’re going 
to have a referendum about 
EU so that is why I don’t 
believe they are very realistic  
Halt Integration Hard Euroscepticism 
oh yes absolutely because 
even like if there is its like a 
double standard. Like if there 
is a Brexit referendum, then 
for the most pro-EU guys to 
say that there was only I think  
it was 55-60 percent went to 
the referendum and that’s not 
enough  and we need every 
last person to vote in order to 
determine the future at the 
same time the EP elections in 
EE that’s about 35% in EE so 
one out of every 3 people is 
deciding the future of Europe 
and even in southern Europe 
its only about 20% 
EU is un-democratic Hard Euroscepticism  
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now the EC is the most 
undemocratic institution in the 
EU and nobody is electing the 
president or vice president of 
the EC and at the same time 
the biggest problem is that a 
bigger population means that 
you have more seats in the EP 
so it means that you have 
more voters and more MEPs 
so that’s the deficit of the 
democracy in the EU 
EU is un-democratic Hard Euroscepticism 
of course Hungary and Poland 
voted against but it was also 
duty for them because there is 
a rule in the EU where if at 
least 55% of the member 
states are deciding in one way 
its gonna be also rule for the 
other side for those who are 
voting against  
Duty Miscellaneous 
typical. It’s a dream. It would 
never happen. The problem is 
if they can’t protect 
themselves, how will they 
build a European army who’s 
going to make this Euro Army 
and will be a part of this army. 
And today the main problem 
of Macron saying that is that 
the line between the French 
and German Defense 
companies and Americans.  
Against EU army soft Euroscepticism 
But at the same time if you 
don’t like the American 
influence in the EU you have 
to pay yourself easy but if you 
are paying 1.5% on defense 
system then its not enough 
Contributions Miscellaneous 
So how will you protect the 
eastern part of Europe from 
Finland to Romania if you 
don’t pay enough for your 
own defense system 
Bad allies Miscellaneous 
I don’t think its very realistic 
dream of a Euro Army at the 
same time the Germans are 
making deals with the 
Bad allies Miscellaneous 
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Russians especially with Nord 
Stream 2 
I think of course in defense 
policy its Russia 
Russia Miscellaneous 
So the biggest question for the 
Russian foreign policy is to 
prove that the NATO is not 
working and that the NATO is 
not very stable  
instability Miscellaneous 
on the same time you have 
Turkey who’s making deals in 
Syria with the Russians so 
should we activate this article 
number 5 I’m pretty sure then 
maybe Turkey would say wait 
lets wait a minute its not very 
clear yet and the Germans too 
would wait are they really 
Russians is it organized by the 
Kremlin 
Bad allies Miscellaneous 
the problem is of course 
Latvia because they have this 
professional army with 4000 
guys  
Bad Allies Miscellaneous  
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Martin Helme Interview: 
Phrase Sub-Code Code 
Well I have to say that its 
probably my calling 
Destiny Miscellaneous 
The background Is that I’m a 
child of the revolution. When 
the Soviet Union began started 
to collapse in the late 1980s 
and Estonia regained its 
independence in 1991 when I 
was 15 years old so my 
formative years were a time 
where it was a tumultuous 
period in Estonian society.  
Independent Nation Miscellaneous 
And of course the further 
background is that my family 
and my parents and 
grandparents were all very 
strongly anti-communist 
throughout the Soviet 
occupation and we were very 
well aware what the Soviet 
Union was and what it was 
and what it had done to our 
relatives what mass killings 
and occupation that was, I 
knew it since I was a child. So 
I was a well-informed 
youngster 
Early Exposure Miscellaneous 
towards this century at the 
beginning of this century more 
and more things began to 
irritate me in politics things 
went from bad to worse 
Dissatisfactoin Sovreignity 
abandonment of the sort of 
national pride and sovreignity 
and all those things rubbed me 
the wrong and I still didn’t 
think that I would be a career 
politician 
Abandon Sovreignity Sovreignity 
. My sort of debut in politics 
was the referendum campaign 
in 2003 where Estonia joined 
the EU and I was in the No 
camp. And our main argument 
was for sovreignity. 
Everything logically follows 
from there if you don’t have 
Argue for sovreignity  Sovreignity 
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sovreignity you don’t have 
control of taxation or over 
value decisions and I have to 
say that 15 years later 
everything that we warned of 
has come to pass 
Everything that we said would 
happened, happened. We were 
right, they were wrong and we 
are right again I think 
Mission Miscellaneous 
Before building up EKRE, 
because I have been here since 
the beginning, I was one of the 
driving forces behind in 
creating it, before that I was 
sort of a lone wolf in politics  
Driving Force Miscellaneous 
but in 2006 we created with 
some like-minded people and 
created a pressure group, an 
activist group called the 
Estonian nationalist movement 
that centered around the 
debate on what to do with 
soviet monuments 
Activist Miscellaneous 
We learned that it would have 
been vulnerable to outside 
manipulations sort of the 
deepstate it would have been 
corrupted by the deep state 
Deep state Populism 
And so but what it did was to 
create and to weed out a few 
dozen people who were 
trustworthy and likeminded 
and had some political 
experience  
Loyalty Miscellaneous 
We said it was doable project 
if we change the name of the 
party changed the program 
changed the constitution of the 
party or the statute of the party 
and they said okay lets do it 
and it was a total remake of 
the organization and also a 
thorough remake of the 
ideology  
Reorganize Miscellaneous 
absolute majority of the 
membership who are mostly 
sort of rural people and small 
Support Family Values Tradition 
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town people and  mostly also 
sort of middle aged to older 
age people were naturally 
inclined to support the policies 
we were proposing. the family 
values the sort of nationalist 
patriotic message the 
sovreignity issue and all anti-
corruption 
we had to deal with quite a 
great debt that was inherited 
and all that. And what we 
immediately did was made the 
decision to put extra effort into 
build the grassroot movement 
and build the local 
organizations and this is the 
logic that is embedded into the 
constitution of the party and is 
the bottom up logic of the 
party 
People’s Support Populism 
We are basically the only 
party in EE at least only party 
in the parliament that actually 
has the members vote the 
candidate list. So, I think it is a 
rather radical departure from 
what everyone else are doing 
and I contribute part of our 
success to it, of course I was 
one of the authors of it 
Members Vote Populism 
So then came the 2014 EP 
elections which went better 
but because the threshold is 
very high we didn’t get a 
mandate 
Better Results Miscellaneous 
and ah okay I forgot the 2015 
parliamentary elections which 
no one thought that we would 
actually succeed but we 
surprised them and here we 
are 
Surprise Miscellaneous 
we didn’t have any really 
representation but again we 
were in the big league and we 
had our own candidate we 
were in all the debates and we 
shifted the debate towards the 
Shift Discourse Miscellaneous  
  Appendix 2 
 
96 
 
themes that we wanted to and 
in a strategic way it was an 
important mile stone. 
Well I don’t think I can really 
answer what makes an 
Estonian. In the short hand It’s 
a question of identity of 
course. A lot of our opponents 
especially on the left of the 
political spectrum mind-
numbingly, stupid-idly try to 
make the issue a genetic issue 
its not a genetic issue  
Identity Miscellaneous 
issue it’s a cultural issue its 
your identity and its 
everything from the 
temperament of the Estonians 
to the weather and to our 
literature and to our national 
heroes and well we have 
precious few heroes but tons 
of national tragedies which 
makes us the way we are and 
which is part of our sort of our 
understanding of the world 
and our suspicion towards the 
world and makes us quite an 
introvert  
Culture As identity Tradition 
 
way that the Estonians behave 
I think part of it is explained 
how we’ve faired in the past I 
don’t know 500 years, every 
100 years someone comes and 
kills half the people so and its 
of course one of I think one of 
the biggest components of the 
Estonian national identity is 
the language 
Unstable Borders Sovreignity 
Its quite an unusual language 
linguistically. Its sort of our 
secret code and it used to be 
during the Soviet times and 
the Tsarist times and when the 
German landlords were ruling 
Unique Tradition 
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Estonia it was the thing that 
differentiated us from the 
others  
and that that’s all part of our 
and the heritage and generally 
the Lutherian work ethics 
which I have to say regretfully 
it’s together with the decline 
of lutherianism is declining as 
well 
Lutherianism Tradition 
Its not just keeping the old 
stuff. What we are saying is 
you constantly have to 
continue and reinforce and 
build up the national sort of 
culture and the national 
identity you can’t say the way 
things were we want to 
preserve it of course we want 
to preserve it but we also want 
to build on it so its not just a 
reactionary way of looking 
things but it is also proactive 
way of looking there’s no 
point of copying Hollywood or 
trying to be like I don’t know, 
Swedes. It’s the exact 
opposite. the point is the exact 
opposite. The point is to be 
ourselves and what makes us 
so special. Becasue everyone 
needs to believe in some way 
we are special. I think 
everyone has to believe that 
we are special 
Special People Demographics 
we should emphasize what is 
different what makes us like 
ourselves. 
Unique Tradition 
Well the Muslim minority was 
miniscule in Finland and in 
Sweden 10 years ago and it 
can change very rapidly and 
100 years ago there were a bit 
more than 100 muslims in 
Holland and now there are 1.5 
million. So it can change very 
rapidly 
Muslim Minority Demographics 
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one of the things is that it is 
much closer cultural 
background than anything 
further out from Africa or 
Middle East  
Culturally closer Demographics 
but we have been fighting with 
the Russians for 1000 years. 
The first big war was in the 
11th century. So we know them 
we know the language we 
know the faith 
Culturally Familiar 
 
 
 
Tradition 
we know the national sort of 
psyche we know them we 
might not like everything 
about it but it is not as alien as 
someone from Sub-Sahara or 
Pakistan 
Aliens Demographics 
We had, not every Russian in 
here is a minority. What we 
have that Is considered a 
minority is everyone who 
lived here before the Second 
World War. And there is a 
small number of them. I think 
about 5-7-8% of those people 
Minority Demographics 
the main bulk came the main 
number came after the 70s and 
80s we consider them to be the 
colonists of the occupation 
Colonists Demographics 
The first chunk is the Russian 
citizens the people who have 
actually taken the Russian 
citizenship and there are over 
100,000 of those now they this 
is the most problematic bunch 
of people  
Russian speakers Demographics 
And then there is the second 
sort of bunch of them which 
have not taken any citizenship 
at all there is a 75,000 of them 
in EE its slowly diminishing 
because they are either take 
Russian citizenship or EE 
citizenship or actually some of 
them go to the EU and its 
slowly declining the number 
but its still a big problem 
Russian speakers Demographics 
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And then there is a third which 
is about 130,000 Russians 
maybe a bit more than that 
who have actually naturalized 
and gone through the process 
of doing the language exam 
and doing the citizenship exam 
and who mostly even they are 
not enthusiastically patriotic 
are more or less loyal to EE. 
Russian Speakers Demographics 
demographic sense is to make 
sure that the that both the 
number and the proportion of 
Estonians in EE is increased 
both the number and the 
proportion that we will grow 
as a nation and we will be in 
an increasing majority and 
when we are talking about the 
Russians in EE or the 
Ukrainians in EE how do we 
achieve it is  
Proportions Demographics 
but as small immigration as 
possible the numbers should 
be really tiny which they are 
not right now 
Small immigration 
 
Demographics 
The number of Russians who 
want to leave EE and not 
necessarily go to Russia or to 
Finland or the US or UK 
should be encouraged and the 
ones who are staying here 
should be not be integrated but 
assimilated. And that is a long 
process that takes two 
generations at least. But that is 
the plan 
 
Number of Russians Demographics 
well we are conservative 
nationalists as the name 
implies. And Center-right 
that’s true. But I wouldn’t 
put… I think they are…we are 
hearing in Europe and the 
United States a lot of labeling 
far-right far right doesn’t mean 
anything some of the parties 
that are labelled far-right are 
Opposed to Federalization Soft Euroscepticism 
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economically far-left quite 
collective in their approach to 
economics 
We are not. we are center right 
when it comes to taxation and 
regulation and stuff like that 
and the individual 
responsibility stuff like that 
Personal Responsibility Populism 
I am not a skeptic I 
wholeheartedly quite readily 
admit that I Am against the 
EU against EE membership of 
the EU I think EU 
membership itself is a horrible 
organization undemocratic 
blatantly left wing it’s a 
socialist endeavor.  
Against EU Hard Eurosceptic 
So the party I’d say is quite 
Eurosceptic, the most 
Eurosceptic party in EE that’s 
probably true and the main 
issue or question of our party 
is sovreignity and the ever 
increasing power grabs by 
Brussels which makes 
democracy a mockery 
Brussels Power Grab Hard Eurosceptic 
When everything is decided in 
Brussels then Democracy in 
EE is pointless you can’t 
really enforce your policies if 
everything has to go first  
through Brussels 
Democracy is pointless Hard Euroscepticism 
First of all I think that it is a 
manipulation to say that 
Estonians are very pro-EU 
Estonians like borderless 
travel in Europe Estonians 
very much like to get subsides 
from the EU and Estonians 
like the inaccurate thought that 
the EU is somehow a defense 
against Russian invasion  
Transactional Soft Euroscepticism 
when you are asked if you 
support common common 
immigration policies or quota 
refugees an overwhelming 
Estonians are against when 
you ask whether the EU view 
Insane Bureaucracy Hard Euroscepticism 
  Appendix 2 
 
101 
 
that same sex marriage is a 
human right absolute majority 
of Estonians is against it. when 
you ask whether Estonians are 
okay with the insane amounts 
of bureaucracy that just flows 
from Brussels Estonians are 
against it. So, I think it’s a 
matter of explaining that its 
how you view the entire 
project its got a lot of levels 
and aspects to it I think the 
skepticism towards the 
superpower or the 
federalization of EE is very 
high  
what you hear often in EE is 
that I support joining the EU 
but I don’t support what it has 
become and I don’t support it 
becoming a federalist entity to 
which if you are intellectually 
honest you say that well the 
EU didn’t even bother to 
change course or slow down 
when the Brits warned that if it 
doesn’t change they would 
leave 
What it has Become Soft Euroscepticism 
which puts the question to us 
rather soon whether we want 
to be a part of that federalized 
entity or this undemocratic 
socialist entity or whether we 
want to leave it and my answer 
is quite clear which way we 
should go. 
 
Undemocratic Hard Euroscepticism 
You have to explain your view 
this is the thing that my dear 
colleagues in other parties and 
my colleagues in my own 
party oftentimes they want to 
go the easy way they want to 
find out what’s the mood of 
the people 
Maintain Position Miscellaneous 
you have to offer them a plan 
and that is usually going 
against the current. Usually 
Go Against Current Miscellaneous 
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you have to open up another 
front and its not an easy and it 
doesn’t bring you immediate 
popularity and it doesn’t bring 
you percentage points but it 
does what it does is vastly 
broadens your political 
playing field and it also mines 
your opponents but mines 
under them and you choose 
your battles yourself and this 
is what I think we’re really 
good at 
We are after something 
different what we are after is 
first of all what we want is to 
attract young people to our 
ideology and you have to have 
young people explaining that 
Young People Spread 
Message 
Populism 
It might work but I don’t have 
the vocabulary. I don’t know 
what an Instagram streak is or 
whatever and but they do and 
so they connect more easily.  
Connect Populism 
we want to bring that sort of 
sentiment to our organization 
and of course it’s a headache 
it’s always a headache they are 
loose canons and you never 
know what problems they may 
cause but it is worth taking. 
Because I mean of course we 
could say that we want a to 
sort of put them under our 
structure and make them take 
orders but that’s not the point 
it would kill off the point of it 
Un-structured Populism 
Let them have fun and also 
they’re the consumary 
revolutionaries. The counter 
culture revolutionaries and 
they can do things that would 
not be good to do for an MP. 
Counter-culture Populism 
We don’t have natural 
coalition partners we are quite 
apart from the others and 
that’s the problem for us we 
are different from all the rest 
Stance on the EU Soft Eurosceptic 
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of them partly because of our 
stance on the EU and partly 
because of other things but to 
answer to the question the 
question who would we like to 
have a coalition with quite 
easily it with the ones that we 
would have a better deal and 
of course we get to the point 
of what’s the thing that 
matters to you what makes a 
deal a good deal 
first of all on our list are two 
subjects that are absolutely red 
lines for us and we can’t 
compromise on them. First of 
all the cohabitation law has to 
go that it is a metaphysical 
fight that is a fight over the 
soul of the Estonian nation 
there is no compromise there 
is no compromise there. It has 
to go. And the second one is 
control of borders. 
Immigration needs to be under 
EE control you can only do 
that when you control your 
borders. Which is to say that 
also within EU we would have 
to start checking documents on 
harbors and airport and 
keeping the immigration to an 
absolute minimum. 
Border control Sovreignity 
that when we enter the 
coalition negotiations our tax 
plan is something that we will 
press very hard because we are 
seeing that EE is suffocating 
under high taxation a heavy 
regulation regime 
High taxes Populism 
we want Estonians to become 
richer we want to be a welfare 
society in the sense that when 
you work hard you will be 
well off.  
Richer Estonians Populism 
of course there are a ton of 
things in education and social 
sphere and what Dave 
Waste of Taxes Populism 
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Cameron once called the 
Bonfire of the quangos, I don’t 
know if you know the term, 
quangos is the governmentally 
organized NGO and there are, 
it is very expensive to the 
Estonian taxpayer to subsidize 
all sorts of do nothing-NGOs 
who are just parasites. So we 
want to get rid of them. That 
will be an ugly fight.  
But it will be a group that 
emphasizes or concentrates on 
sovreignity of nation states in 
Europe. That wants to transfer 
power from Brussels to 
national capitals. It will be an 
anti-federalist entity. My 
favorite government right now 
in Europe of course is in Italy 
and but it is encouraging to see 
the Austrian governments the 
Czech government the Polish 
government, the Hungarian 
government you probably start 
looking from your allies from 
that circle 
Similar parties Hard Euroscepticism 
there are small and competing 
groups there that have historic 
reasons why they don’t get 
along and some of them have 
age old grievances against 
each other. and some of the 
Eurosceptics and that’s the 
problem. Euroscepticism 
Distrust 
 
Hard Euroscepticism 
So its quite different and that’s 
the point of it and I don’t 
know if we can find common 
ground with Front National for 
instance I am not sure I don’t 
know if we can actually work 
with the Italian Lega I don’t 
know them. I know we have a 
similar view of the world of 
Europe as some of the Eastern 
European countries  
Nation state Sovreignity 
they are all probably very 
much afraid that including a 
Racist Miscellaneous 
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well known racist amongst 
themselves them is bad 
publicity you know how it 
works out because I am well 
aware that if you google me in 
English there’s nothing good 
coming for me 
I see direct democracy or 
referendum initiative by the 
people as a best antidote to 
globalization because what the 
problem is with representative 
democracy is that you have 
elections every four years 
everyone makes noises about 
defending your national 
interests and then of course 
once the elections are over 
everything is the same old 
same old and the I think it’s a 
crisis of democracy 
Antidote to globalism populism 
the solution to the crisis of 
democracy is not to have less 
democracy or to fight the 
populists or whatever but the 
solution is to have more 
democracy In our programme 
one of the things that we 
propose is the referendum 
initiative the second thing is 
direct presidential elections 
also some changes to the way 
the mandates are handed out in 
the elections to make the 
elections more equal between 
different constituencies and 
also we have proposed that we 
should look at a way of 
recalling elected officials so 
we want to see a recall 
mechanism in EE 
More Democracy Populism 
and I think that what it will do 
is strengthen democracy and it 
will make the political class 
more inclined to hear what the 
people want or don’t want 
More democracy Populism 
Well I think the 
antidemocratic nature of the 
EU as Anti-democratic Hard Euroscepticism 
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EU is not a bug it’s a feature 
as they say it’s the way the 
system was designed. I find it 
absolutely repugnant that we 
have some 8000 directives and 
some 6000, what’s the other 
thing they do…directives are 
the ones that you can change a 
bit and the other ones come 
straight…anyways we have 
well of a ¼ of a million pages 
of legislation in EE and 
absolute majority of them are 
EU 
Well what’s the point of 
having different parties then? 
what’s the point of having 
elections with different 
platforms? If there are things 
that we don’t like then we 
won’t have it in our laws and 
that’s it. 
EU over nation state Hard Euroscepticism 
The other thing of course is 
that the EU is really very 
similar to the USSR in that 
one size fits all. You have the 
similar interest rates in Ireland 
Portugal and Greece Estonia 
and Germany that’s nuts that 
is absolutely nuts that’s the 
reason why the countries are 
bankrupt that’s the reason for 
all the banking crisis that’s 
absolutely nuts you have 
similar standards for 
agriculture in countries like 
Finland were you have polar 
nights and countries like 
Greece Italy and Spain where 
you have deserts 
Similar to USSR Hard Euroscepticism 
We cant compare ourselves 
with Germany with its 85 
million inhabitance and much 
more milder climate better 
capitalization of industry and 
stuff like that we have no 
chance of competing with 
them but we have our own 
National Advantages Sovreignity 
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advantages we are small and 
dynamic and we’ve got our 
own energy and stuff like that 
and we are just throwing that 
away all of our advantages 
away that’s nuts its delusional 
self-harm. 
And of course everything that 
I have just described is a left-
wing utopia that by decreeing 
something from Brussels and 
the people that are decreeing 
answer to no one absolutely no 
one the Commission answers 
to absolutely no one and all of 
the sudden it has legitimacy 
for 550 million people its 
rubbish 
Left-wing Utopia Hard Euroscepticism 
regulated left-wing 
progressive cultural Marxist 
ideology  
Cultural Marxist Hard Euroscepticism 
the open hostility towards 
nationalism or nation states the 
open hostility towards the 
nation state the open hostility 
towards self sustainable 
economic models that is an 
ideological project that has no 
legitimacy. Has no democratic 
control over it. And is making 
life more miserable to people 
of Europe than anything that 
they ever dreamed of so, no no 
no no no, its got to go 
Hostility Towards nation state Hard Euroscepticism 
Oh no it has done everything 
in its power, its by design that 
they have isolated themselves 
from the popular consent. It is 
an objective itself that they 
have isolated themselves from 
the consent of the people from 
the democratic process. So it 
cant work. The only way it can 
work is if they use, quite 
openly use, totalitarian 
methods and that would bring 
bloodbath to Europe which I 
think is quite a possible 
Isolate from popular consent Hard Euroscepticism 
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scenario anyway. Because we 
are just fighting now for 
Freedom 
Absolutely against it. It is just 
diabolic. For quite practical 
reasons as well. First of all it’s 
a parallel structure to NATO 
and drains resources and 
creates confusion 
Against EU army Soft Euroscepticism 
Also, for the reason that 
emulating the same model that 
the EU does is that its not 
really putting any resources of 
its own but hijacking the 
resources of the nation states 
and taking them under their 
control and using them to 
advance their own political 
goals. Many of them is to 
strengthen their own 
centralization of power 
Hijacking resources Hard Euroscepticism 
So we will keep putting in 2% 
of our GDP to defense forces 
but it will not be up to us when 
to use and where to use it but 
someone in Brussels decides 
to now is the time to go to 
Mali for instance or when we 
are attacked by the Russians, 
someone in Brussels decides 
that no no stand down. 
Absolutely I rule out that we 
will if we are in power entirely 
disentangle ourselves from 
that 
Against EU Army Soft Euroscepticism 
well the long term threat is 
demographics. Everything 
boils down to demographics 
There is of course not a simple 
thing its Immigration 
emigration birth rates stuff like 
this. But that is the main issue 
that should overarch 
everything. If we don’t have 
enough kids nothing we do has 
any point. If we have enough 
kids but they are still swarmed 
by immigration we are making 
Threat is Demographics Demographics 
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our lives a hell anyways. If we 
are having enough kids but 
they are moving out then that 
is also a pointless policy So 
we have to make all of those 
things work in a proper way 
Now in the short term, I think 
that the instability of the 
European project will create 
political and economic stress 
that will be very high that will 
create political and societal 
instability as well in EE as 
well and we have to be 
prepared for that and we have 
to also be prepared that for 
whenever the European 
project starts to unravel and I 
am quite sure that it will much 
sooner than people actually 
realize, Russia will not let that 
opportunity pass without 
creating some major problem 
so this is walking the tight 
rope in the next I don’t know 5 
years. 
Europe will unravel Hard Euroscepticism 
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